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Expressing its concern about growing rates of cancer and other diseases, coupled with the lack of data about
the effect of the thousands of chemicals used in U.S. society, in 1976 Congress enacted the Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA). Congress intended for TSCA to shed new light on chemical risks and provide the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with a set of tools to address those risks and protect human health
and the environment. In the years since TSCA’s passage, the procedural hurdles and the difficult-to-meet legal
standards built into the statute, along with a court decision rejecting EPA’s use of its authority to ban
dangerous chemicals, have impeded EPA’s ability to regulate chemical use and manufacture. This Comment
argues that both the EPA and state governments have the authority to act now to address the risks posed by
dangerous chemicals. By utilizing certain sections of the statute in new and aggressive ways, EPA can
effectively address chemical risks. Further, this Comment argues that TSCA’s preemption provision affords
states leeway to continue to regulate the use of chemicals within their borders. Though reform of TSCA is
necessary, EPA and states can effectively protect against chemical risks in the near-term by using the full extent
of their authority under the current law.
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Expressing its concern about growing rates of cancer and other diseases, coupled
with the lack of data about the effect of the thousands of chemicals used in U.S. society,
in 1976 Congress enacted the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). Congress
intended for TSCA to shed new light on chemical risks and provide the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with a set of tools to address those risks and
protect human health and the environment. In the years since TSCA’s passage, the
procedural hurdles and the difficult-to-meet legal standards built into the statute,
along with a court decision rejecting EPA’s use of its authority to ban dangerous
chemicals, have impeded EPA’s ability to regulate chemical use and manufacture.
This Comment argues that both the EPA and state governments have the authority to
act now to address the risks posed by dangerous chemicals. By utilizing certain
sections of the statute in new and aggressive ways, EPA can effectively address
chemical risks. Further, this Comment argues that TSCA’s preemption provision
affords states leeway to continue to regulate the use of chemicals within their borders.
Though reform of TSCA is necessary, EPA and states can effectively protect against
chemical risks in the near-term by using the full extent of their authority under the
current law.
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INTRODUCTION
Almost thirty years after the passage of the Toxic Substances
1
Control Act (TSCA) in 1976, a study of the umbilical cords of infants
born in 2004 found that they contained almost 300 manmade
2
chemicals. Many of the detected chemicals have been linked to
1. President Ford signed TSCA into law on October 11, 1976. See Pub. L. No.
94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–92 (2006)).
2. See JANE HOULIHAN ET AL., ENVTL. WORKING GRP., BODY BURDEN: THE
POLLUTION IN NEWBORNS 13 (2005), available at http://www.ewg.org/
reports_content/bodyburden2/pdf/bodyburden2_final-r2.pdf (recognizing that
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3

cancer, birth defects, and developmental abnormalities. Congress
passed TSCA as a precautionary measure—an intended preventative
regulatory scheme to address the health and environmental risks
associated with the rapidly increasing presence of chemicals in
4
Americans’ daily lives. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) Administrator at the time, Russell E. Train, described TSCA as
“a major step toward an increasingly effective preventive approach
toward the ‘environmental disease’ that has been called the ‘disease
5
of the century.’” However, three and a half decades later, Congress’s
6
attempt at chemical regulation is widely regarded as a failure. This
failure has been attributed to the procedural burdens imposed on
7
EPA by the statute itself, substantive burdens imposed by both the
8
statute and subsequent court interpretations, and, until very recently,
9
a lack of aggressive implementation on the part of EPA.
while scientists used to believe that the placenta shielded developing babies from
most chemicals, recent science has made it clear that “at this critical time when
organs, vessels, membranes and systems are [formed] . . . the umbilical cord carries
not only the building blocks of life, but also a steady stream of industrial chemicals,
pollutants and pesticides”).
3. See id. at 13–14 (noting that infants are more susceptible to harm from these
chemical exposures).
4. See TSCA § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (2006) (articulating the congressional
findings that (1) “human beings and the environment are being exposed each year
to a large number of chemical[s],” (2) “there are some [chemicals] whose
manufacture . . . may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment,” and (3) “the effective regulation” of such chemicals requires
regulation of both interstate and intrastate commerce); see also COUNCIL ON ENVTL.
QUALITY, TOXIC SUBSTANCES 21 (1971), reprinted in H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES
CONTROL ACT, at 784 (Comm. Print 1976) (“We need no longer be limited to
repairing damage after it has been done; nor should we allow the general population
to be used as a laboratory for discovering adverse health effects [of chemical
exposure].”).
5. See Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Train Sees New Toxic Substances
Law as “Preventative Medicine” (Oct. 21, 1976), http://www.epa.gov/
history/topics/tsca/03.html.
6. See, e.g., HOULIHAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 33 (characterizing TSCA as “the
nation’s notoriously weak chemical safety law”); see also James T. O’Reilly, Torture by
TSCA: Retrospectives of a Failed Statute, NATURAL RES. & ENV’T, Summer 2010, at 43
(“TSCA was floated with great ambitions, but it has bombed with tepid results . . . .
TSCA has failed and left us with a mere façade of effective environmental action.
Industry in the United States dodged the bullet.”).
7. See infra Part I.B.1 (describing the extensive procedures EPA must follow in
issuing a rule under TSCA in addition to those required under the Administrative
Procedure Act).
8. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1217 (5th Cir. 1991)
(requiring that EPA perform an extensive quantitative analysis to justify issuing a
section 6 rule). But see infra Part II.C (arguing that the court’s interpretation of what
is required of EPA under section 6 is contrary to both the language of the statute and
its legislative history).
9. Since TSCA was passed, “only five . . . chemicals have been regulated under
[EPA’s section 6] ban authority.” The Toxic Chemicals Safety Act of 2010: Hearing on
H.R. 5820 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on
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While far from a perfect tool, TSCA remains the only statutory tool
10
available to regulate many of the chemicals that enter commerce —
and subsequently the environment and the human body—every day.
Reform is necessary to address the procedural and substantive
11
obstacles posed by the current law; in the meantime, TSCA offers
opportunities for regulation before a reform bill is enacted. With
12
new chemical risks continually coming to light, meaningful
regulatory action at both the federal and state level is possible, and is
13
happening, right now.
This Comment argues that by utilizing the full extent of its
authority under the current statute, EPA can more fully effectuate
TSCA’s goal of minimizing the risks of dangerous chemicals, and that
TSCA’s preemption provision allows for state action to regulate
chemicals to supplement what can be done at the federal level. This
Comment begins by presenting the backdrop to which the current
debate over TSCA is set. Part I describes the history and purpose of
TSCA, outlines key sections of the legislation and EPA’s authority
under those sections, and discusses the main hurdles to TSCA’s
Energy
and
Commerce,
111th
Cong.
2
(2010),
available
at
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100729/Owens.Testim
ony.07.29.2010.pdf [hereinafter TSCA Hearings] (statement of Steve Owens, Assistant
Administrator, Office of Chem. Safety and Pollution Prevention, U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency). However, since 2009, EPA has announced that it is considering using its
section 6 authority to ban or otherwise limit seven additional chemicals. See Action
Plan Fact Sheet, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Apr. 2011), http://www.epa.gov/
oppt/existingchemicals/pubs/overview.pdf (providing an overview of EPA’s
“Chemical Action Plans” for ten listed chemicals, seven of which EPA is considering
banning or restricting under § 6).
10. TSCA regulates “‘chemical substance[s],’” a term that is defined very
expansively in the statute: it refers to “any organic or inorganic substance.” TSCA §
3(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(A) (2006). However, Congress excluded chemicals
that were already regulated specifically under other statutory schemes; TSCA does
not apply to pesticides, tobacco, nuclear materials, firearms, and “any food, food
additive, drug, cosmetic, or device.” Id. § 3(2)(B)(i)–(vi).
11. See infra Part I.C.2 (describing current reform efforts); infra Conclusion
(concluding that reform is necessary for truly effective chemical management).
12. See Bryan Walsh, The Perils of Plastic, TIME, Apr. 1, 2010,
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1976909_1976908,00
.html (“Since World War II, production of industrial chemicals has risen rapidly, and
the U.S. generates or imports some 42 billion lb. (19 billion kg) of them per day. . . .
Those chemicals have a habit of finding their way out of everyday products and into
the environment—and ultimately into living organisms.”).
13. See Enhancing EPA’s Chemical Management Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/oppt/existingchemicals/pubs/enhanchems.html (last updated
Sept. 14, 2011) (laying out EPA’s plans for more aggressive use of its TSCA authority:
“EPA is initiating a comprehensive approach to enhance the Agency’s current
chemicals management program within the limits of existing authorities”). See
generally MIKE BELLIVEAU, SAFER CHEMS. HEALTHY FAMILIES, HEALTHY STATES:
PROTECTING FAMILIES FROM TOXIC CHEMICALS WHILE CONGRESS LAGS BEHIND (2010),
available
at
http://www.saferchemicals.org/PDF/reports/HealthyStates.pdf
(analyzing state efforts to regulate chemicals in the absence of federal regulation).
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implementation. It completes the picture by giving an overview of
the current landscape, including descriptions of state law responses
to TSCA’s failures, the two principal proposed TSCA reform bills, and
EPA’s current plans to make the most of its TSCA authority.
Part II argues that, by utilizing the full extent of its existing
authority, EPA currently has the ability to make TSCA better serve its
purpose in the near term. EPA has proposed a number of aggressive
new actions that this Comment argues are well within the Agency’s
current authority and are likely to withstand any post-implementation
court challenges. Part III then argues that TSCA’s preemption
provision affords states leeway to regulate chemicals within their
borders even more expansively than EPA can, thus supplementing
what can be done at the federal level. This Comment concludes by
recommending that TSCA be reformed to remove the procedural
and substantive obstacles under the current law, thus allowing EPA to
regulate chemical risks even more effectively and efficiently. This
would in turn reduce the need for the current patchwork of state
regulation.
I.

BACKGROUND

Congress passed TSCA in 1976 to address two significant regulatory
14
gaps: the lack of information about the risks of chemicals and the
15
absence of authority to address and minimize those risks. However,
significant hurdles to TSCA’s implementation resulted in these needs
16
going largely unmet. In response to these hurdles and a growing
consensus that TSCA has failed to live up to its mandates, TSCA
17
reform has become a major discussion point among stakeholders.
The evolution of TSCA from its promising beginnings, to its

14. See TSCA § 2(b) (“It is the policy of the United States that—(1) adequate
data should be developed with respect to the effect of chemical substances . . . on
health and the environment . . . .”).
15. See id. § 2(b)(2) (“[A]dequate authority should exist to regulate chemical
substances . . . which present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment . . . .”).
16. See infra Part I.B (identifying the procedural, legal standard, and judicial
review obstacles that have impeded EPA’s ability to effectively regulate under TSCA).
17. See, e.g., John S. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH: Practical Principles
for Chemical Regulation Reform, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 765 (2008) (advocating that “if
TSCA is to be truly preventive, TSCA reform must incorporate provisions that
expressly permit EPA to act in advance of full information”); Malcolm D. Woolf, Why
Modernization of the U.S. Toxic Substances Law is Good for Public Health and Business,
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Spring 2006, at 4 (describing the reasons why TSCA
should be reformed from the perspective of both public health advocates and
chemical manufacturers).
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ineffectiveness in practice, and to its proposed reform, is discussed
below.
A. Purpose and Scope of TSCA
TSCA was enacted during what has been described as “the most
active phase of federal environmental law-making this country has
18
ever seen.”
The central purpose of TSCA is to prevent the
“unreasonable risk” of injury to human health or the environment
19
due to chemical manufacturing and use. TSCA’s introduction was
spurred by the 1971 report Toxic Substances, which was prepared by
20
the newly established Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ).
On the basis of available data and growing fears about the unknown
dangers posed by largely unregulated chemicals, this report made a
series of straightforward findings that were the impetus for TSCA’s
introduction and passage: (1) toxic substances were entering the
environment; (2) the effects of these substances were largely
unknown and potentially severe; (3) existing legal mechanisms were
not suited to address these effects; and (4) new legal authority was
21
required. In February 1971, a new legal authority was proposed:
President Nixon submitted to Congress a version of the bill that
22
would become TSCA. After five years of debate and fifteen days of
23
hearings, TSCA emerged in its current form and was signed into law
24
in October 1976.
This Comment will analyze three primary tools delegated to EPA by
TSCA to accomplish Congress’s stated intent: (1) section 4 testing
authority, (2) section 5 notice requirements, and (3) section 6
authority to limit or ban a chemical substance. The following

18. David Markell, An Overview of TSCA, Its History and Key Underlying Assumptions,
and Its Place in Environmental Regulation, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 333, 334 (2010); see
also id. at 334 n.6 (observing that the majority of major environmental laws, including
the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act
were enacted in the 1970s).
19. See TSCA § 2(b) (“It is the policy of the United States that . . . adequate
authority should exist to regulate chemical substances and mixtures which present
an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment . . . .” (emphasis added)).
20. See generally COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 4 (detailing the dangers
posed by toxic substances and calling for regulation).
21. See id. at 759–60.
22. Id. at 761. TSCA was proposed before Toxic Substances was published in April
1971 because the pressing nature of the findings necessitated that CEQ resources be
diverted to writing the legislation before the report could be finalized. Id. at 758.
23. S. REP. NO. 94-698, at 3 (1976), reprinted in H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES
CONTROL ACT, at 159 (Comm. Print 1976).
24. Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–
92 (2006)).
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subsections provide a brief overview of these three provisions of
TSCA, and Part II addresses courts’ interpretations of the features of
25
these provisions.
1.

Section 4: Authority to require testing of chemicals
Section 4 of TSCA establishes EPA’s authority to require testing of
26
chemical substances. EPA exercises this authority by issuing a rule
requiring the manufacturers of certain chemicals to perform a series
of tests to determine the chemicals’ health and environmental effects
27
(hereinafter known as a “test rule”). In enacting TSCA, Congress
declared that “this provision would no longer allow the public or the
environment to be used as a testing ground for the safety of
28
[chemical] products.”
Section 4(a) of TSCA provides EPA with two separate bases on
which it can require testing of chemical substances. Under section
4(a)(1)(A), EPA can require testing for chemicals that “may present
29
an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.”
Alternatively, under section 4(a)(1)(B), EPA can mandate that
manufacturers test chemicals for which there is insufficient
information to determine whether the chemical presents a risk to
health or the environment, and thus testing is needed to “develop
30
such data.” EPA can use its section 4(a)(1)(B) authority to fill in
data gaps for chemicals that are (1) “produced in substantial
quantities,” and (2) either “enter the environment in substantial
quantities” or will result in “substantial human exposure” to the
31
chemical.
32
In Chemical Manufacturers Association v. EPA, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that EPA has discretion to
determine the quantities of chemical production and the levels of
human exposure that rise to the level of being “substantial,” such that

25. The legal standards that EPA must meet to use its authority under these three
provisions are also discussed in Part I.B (in the context of hurdles to
implementation). Part II discusses these sections in the context of opportunities for
EPA to use relevant provisions to effectuate TSCA’s stated purpose.
26. TSCA § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (2006) (entitled “Testing of chemical substances
and mixtures”).
27. See id. § 4(a) (stating that once the requisite findings have been made with
respect to a chemical or mixture, “the Administrator shall by rule require that testing
be conducted on such substance or mixture”).
28. S. REP. NO. 94-698, at 3.
29. See TSCA § 4(a)(1)(A)(i) (limiting testing to chemicals whose health and
environmental effects cannot be determined with existing information).
30. Id. § 4(a)(1)(B).
31. See id.
32. 899 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1990).
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33

they trigger EPA’s section 4(a)(1)(B) authority. In that case, the
Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) challenged a rule that
EPA issued requiring manufacturers of the chemical cumene “to
perform certain toxicological testing . . . to determine [cumene’s]
34
health and environmental effects.” CMA argued that EPA’s estimate
of the quantity of cumene that entered the environment was too
35
high. It urged the court to accept its considerably lower estimate of
cumene emissions and accordingly find that there was not a
36
“substantial quantity” of cumene entering the environment.
The Fifth Circuit held that while EPA’s estimate was supported by
37
substantial evidence, because neither TSCA nor its legislative history
define what amount of a chemical constitutes a “substantial quantity,”
the court could not determine whether the amount of cumene
emissions presented by EPA was sufficient to trigger its statutory
38
authority. Further, because “substantial quantity” and substantial
human or environmental exposure were left undefined in the statute,
the court held that Congress had delegated the authority to define
39
and interpret these terms to EPA. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit
rejected CMA’s construction of what amount constituted a
“substantial quantity,” and remanded the case to EPA to define the
term “substantial” within section 4(a)(1)(B), noting that EPA has
“considerable latitude” and “[r]oom must be left for the exercise of
40
judgment” in complying with the court’s mandate.
Though the Fifth Circuit did not cite to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
41
Inc., the logic of the Court’s decision in Chevron underlies the
reasoning applied in Chemical Manufacturers. In Chevron, the Supreme
Court held that where “Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue,” in a statute, but rather has explicitly “left a
gap for the agency to fill,” the reviewing court shall not overturn an
agency’s interpretation unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
42
contrary to the statute.” In a later decision, the Supreme Court
33. Id. at 359.
34. Id. at 346.
35. Id. at 352.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also TSCA § 19(c)(1)(B)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 2618(c)(1)(B)(i) (2006)
(setting a substantial evidence standard of review based on the rulemaking record for
section 4 test rules).
38. Chem. Mfrs., 899 F.2d at 354.
39. See id. (noting that the court must accept EPA interpretations that are
rational and consistent with the statute).
40. See id. at 359–60.
41. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
42. See id. at 843–44 (adding that for instances when Congress implicitly
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clarified that the level of deference afforded to agency
interpretations under its opinion in Chevron was reserved for areas of
a statute where the agency had the authority to speak with the force
of law, such as the rulemaking authority set out by Congress in
43
section 4(a)(1)(B).
Thus, in accordance with the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Chemical
Manufacturers and the principles from the Supreme Court’s holding
in Chevron, in 1993 EPA published guidance in the Federal Register
describing the criteria it would use to determine when a test rule
issued pursuant to section 4(a)(1)(B) is necessary (hereinafter
44
“guidance document”). EPA defined the term “substantial quantity”
of a chemical for the purposes of triggering section 4(a)(1)(B) of
TSCA as greater than or equal to one million pounds, in reference to
both chemical production levels as well as the amount of a chemical
45
released into the environment. Due to the intricacies of defining a
term as vague and potentially far-reaching as “substantial human
46
exposure,” EPA defined what constitutes “substantial human
exposure” for various situations: more than 100,000 people for the
general population; more than 10,000 people for consumers; and
47
more than 1000 people for workers. In setting these quantities, EPA
exercised the interpretive discretion that Congress granted it in
48
having “left a gap for the agency to fill” in section 4(a)(1)(B), as
49
recognized by the Fifth Circuit in Chemical Manufacturers.

delegates authority, courts should not disturb an agency’s “reasonable
interpretation[s] of statutory provisions”).
43. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (offering
administrative adjudication and notice-and-comment rulemaking as examples of
congressional intent to delegate an agency authority to make rules with the force of
law).
44. TSCA Section 4(a)(1)(B) Final Statement of Policy; Criteria for Evaluating
Substantial Production, Substantial Release, and Substantial or Significant Human
Exposure, 58 Fed. Reg. 28,736 (May 14, 1993).
45. See id. at 28,746 (“EPA believes a threshold value of 1 million pounds is a
reasonable interpretation of the phrase ‘produced in substantial quantities’ in TSCA
section 4(a)(1)(B)(i)[,] [and] EPA believes that [1 million pounds] is a reasonable
interpretation of the phrase ‘enters the environment in substantial quantities’ in
TSCA section 4(a)(1)(B)(i)(I).”).
46. See Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 899 F.2d 344, 359 (5th Cir. 1990) (“We
recognize that ‘substantial’ is an inherently imprecise word. We are also aware that .
. . no definition or group of criteria can be established which will function like a
mathematical formula, so that for every given set of facts a specific, predictable
answer will always be forthcoming.”).
47. Id.
48. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
49. See Chem. Mfrs., 899 F.2d at 346 (indicating that TSCA authorized EPA to
promulgate test rules).
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2.

Section 5: Notice of chemical production and potential for regulation
Where section 4 is predominantly about chemical testing, section 5
of TSCA requires manufacturers to give EPA notice before they begin
producing a new chemical or producing an existing chemical that
50
will be put to a new use. This section reflects Congress’s rationale
that “[t]he most effective and efficient time to prevent unreasonable
risks to public health or the environment is prior to first
51
manufacture.”
In addition to requiring that manufacturers give
EPA advance notice of chemical production, section 5(b)(4)(A) of
TSCA states that EPA can issue a rule listing chemicals that EPA finds
“present[] or may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or
52
the environment.” In determining whether to make such a list, and
which chemicals to add, TSCA dictates that EPA weigh “all relevant
factors,” explicitly requiring EPA to consider the chemical
substance’s health effects, as well the degree of environmental
53
exposure to the chemical.
54
The term “unreasonable risk” is not defined in the statute and has
55
not been addressed by courts in the context of section 5 of TSCA.
However, courts have interpreted this term in relation to section 4 of
56
TSCA. The language in the statute triggering a section 4(a)(1)(A)
test rule and a section 5(b)(4)(A) rule similarly permits EPA to issue
a rule where a chemical “may present an unreasonable risk of injury
57
to health or the environment.” The Supreme Court has held that
50. See TSCA § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a) (2006) (requiring that manufacturers of
new chemicals or existing chemicals put to “a significant new use” must provide EPA
with ninety days notice before the chemical can be manufactured).
51. See S. REP. NO. 94-698, at 5 (1976), reprinted in H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES
CONTROL ACT, at 161 (Comm. Print 1976).
52. TSCA § 5(b)(4)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
53. Id. § 5(b)(4)(A)(ii).
54. See id. § 3 (failing to include a definition of “unreasonable risk” in this
“definitions” section of the statute).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 208–209 (explaining that because EPA has
never used section 5(b)(4)(A), there is no precedent defining this term).
56. See, e.g., Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 859 F.2d 977, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (ruling
that EPA can issue a test rule when its findings provide a “substantial” or “more-thantheoretical” basis for determining that a chemical “may present” an “unreasonable
risk” exists); Ausimont U.S.A. Inc. v. EPA, 838 F.2d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 1988) (upholding
a test rule where “an existing possibility of harm raise[d] reasonable and legitimate
cause for concern”).
57. Compare TSCA § 5(b)(4)(A)(i) (“The Administrator may, by rule, compile
and keep current a list of chemical substances with respect to which the
Administrator finds that the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use,
or disposal, or any combination of such activities, presents or may present an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.” (emphasis added)), with id. §
4(a) (“If the Administrator finds that—the manufacture, distribution in commerce,
processing, use, or disposal of a chemical substance or mixture, or that any
combination of such activities, may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
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when interpreting an undefined statutory term that appears in
multiple places in the same statute, courts are to presume that the
58
meaning is the same in each instance. While this presumption can
be overcome by a finding that Congress intended that words be given
59
Part II.B argues that here, the term
different meanings,
“unreasonable risk” should be interpreted in the same manner in
both the section 4(a)(1)(A) and section 5(b)(4)(A) contexts, and
thus section 4(a)(1)(A) precedent is illustrative of how courts would
60
interpret this term as used in section 5(b)(4)(A).
In reviewing a challenge to a 4(a)(1)(A) test rule, the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit observed in Chemical
61
Manufacturers Association v. EPA that in the absence of an indication
as to level of “unreasonable risk” that EPA must find before
regulating a chemical, Congress left it to EPA to determine whether
and to what degree a chemical poses “unreasonable risk” such that
62
regulation is necessary. As stated by the Supreme Court in Chevron,
if Congress does not address an issue in the statute, such as the
definition of “unreasonable risk,” then courts should look to an
agency’s construction of the term and uphold it so long as it is
63
reasonable. Specifically, the Chevron Court determined that “[i]f
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill [in the
statute],” then Congress expressly delegated to the agency the
64
authority to “elucidate” the meaning of the statute in its regulation.
Applying the Supreme Court’s analysis from Chevron, the D.C.
Circuit upheld EPA’s construction of “unreasonable risk” as requiring
that EPA only show that the risk is “more-than-theoretical,” as
opposed to being “more likely than not,” as argued for by the
65
Chemical Manufacturers Association. The court’s ultimate holding,
environment . . . [along with additional requirements] the Administrator shall by rule
require that testing be conducted . . . .”(emphasis added)).
58. See Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007).
59. See id. (acknowledging that context can compel interpreting the same word
in a different way).
60. See infra Part II.B.
61. 859 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Although this case involved the same parties
and has the same name as the Fifth Circuit case discussed above in Part I.A.1, this
D.C. Circuit litigation was wholly distinct from the Fifth Circuit litigation. I have
attempted to clearly differentiate between the two cases.
62. Id. at 984.
63. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–
44 (1984).
64. Id.
65. See Chem. Mfrs., 859 F.2d at 985 (noting that the legislative history of TSCA
“not only shows that ‘unreasonable risk’ need not be a matter of absolute certainty; it
shows the reasonableness of EPA’s conclusion that ‘unreasonable risk’ need not be
established to a more-probable-than-not degree”).
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which it noted was supported by the findings of other circuits, was
that EPA has the authority to issue a section 4 rule so long as it has a
“more-than-theoretical basis” for believing that there is some level of
human exposure to the chemical at issue and the chemical is toxic
enough at that level to create an “unreasonable risk of injury” to
67
human health.
Courts determine whether to uphold EPA’s finding that a chemical
presents an “unreasonable risk” using the substantial evidence
68
69
standard of review.
In Ausimont U.S.A. Inc. v. EPA, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed a challenge to
a section 4(a)(1)(A) test rule and described what a substantial
evidence review of EPA’s finding of unreasonable risk looks like:
“[H]ere we look to see if the Administrator produced substantial
70
evidence to demonstrate not fact, but doubt and uncertainty.”
Similar to both the D.C. Circuit and Fifth Circuit Chemical
Manufacturers cases, the Third Circuit held that where EPA has
supported its findings with scientific studies, and the challengers to
the rule have not shown fundamental or fatal flaws in these studies,
EPA has met its burden of proving the “unreasonable risk” of a
71
chemical substance.
3.

Section 6: The authority to ban or otherwise limit chemical substances
Section 6 is TSCA’s most aggressive provision, providing EPA with
the authority to impose a range of restrictions, from labeling
72
requirements to a complete ban. To issue a section 6 rule, EPA
must first find “that there is a reasonable basis to conclude that” the
production of a chemical “will present an unreasonable risk of injury
73
to health or the environment.” EPA then “shall by rule apply one or
more [listed regulatory] requirements to such substance or mixture
to the extent necessary to protect adequately against such risk using

66. See Ausimont U.S.A. Inc. v. EPA, 838 F.2d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 1988) (upholding a
test rule where “an existing possibility of harm raises reasonable and legitimate cause
for concern”); Shell Chem. Co. v. EPA, 826 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1987) (remanding
to explore additional evidence without deciding how strong a showing of
“unreasonable risk” must be to warrant a test rule).
67. Chem. Mfrs., 859 F.2d at 987–88 (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. TSCA § 19(c)(1)(B)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 2618(c)(1)(B)(i) (2006); see also Chem.
Mfrs., 859 F.2d at 991–92 (observing that the standard of review for TSCA regulations
is more stringent than for agency decisions under other statutes).
69. 838 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1988).
70. Id. at 96.
71. Id. at 96–97.
72. TSCA § 6(a).
73. Id.
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74

the least burdensome requirements.” EPA has used its authority
under section 6 to regulate only five chemicals since TSCA was
enacted; as a basis for comparison, there are over 84,000 chemicals
75
listed in EPA’s TSCA inventory. EPA’s limited use of its section 6
authority has largely been attributed to the Fifth Circuit’s rejection of
its section 6 ban on asbestos, despite this chemical’s status as a known
76
carcinogen.
B. Hurdles to Implementation
When Congress passed TSCA, EPA Administrator Russell Train
stated that EPA was “ready to start carrying out [its] responsibilities
77
under the law openly and effectively.” Thirty-three years later, in
2009, the current Administrator of EPA, Lisa Jackson, noted that
people are still turning to EPA for “assurance that chemicals have
been assessed using the best available science, and that unacceptable
risks haven’t been ignored,” yet EPA is unable to provide this
78
assurance under the current law. TSCA’s implementation to date
has led to the statute’s characterization as an “inadequate tool” for
79
protecting the public and the environment from chemical risks.
The three primary reasons for this are discussed below.
1.

Procedural obstacles
For EPA to use its authority to require testing under section 4,
certain aspects of its notice-related authority under section 5, as well
as its authority to ban or limit chemicals under section 6, EPA must
issue a rule and in doing so, comply with extensive procedural
80
In executing its authority under these provisions,
requirements.
74. Id.
75. See TSCA Hearings, supra note 9, at 2 (statement of Steve Owens, Assistant
Administrator, Office of Chem. Safety and Pollution Prevention, U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency) (lamenting EPA’s lack of success in regulating only a small portion of the
chemicals listed in EPA’s inventory); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-05-458, CHEMICAL REGULATION: OPTIONS EXIST TO IMPROVE EPA’S ABILITY TO
ASSESS HEALTH RISKS AND MANAGE ITS CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM 58–60 (2005)
(listing the five chemicals which EPA has regulated under section 6, all of which
occurred before the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA).
76. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1229–30 (5th Cir. 1991)
(rejecting EPA’s asbestos ban, while also acknowledging the hazards of asbestos use).
77. Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 5.
78. Lisa Jackson, Administrator, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Remarks to the
Commonwealth Club of San Francisco (Sept 29, 2009), http://yosemite.epa.gov/
opa/admpress.nsf/a883dc3da7094f97852572a00065d7d8/fc4e2a8c05343b32852576
40007081c5!OpenDocument.
79. Id. (noting that TSCA has “been proven an inadequate tool for providing the
protection against chemical risks that the public rightfully expects”).
80. TSCA §§ 4(b)(5), 5(b)(4)(C), 6(c)(2)–(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2603(b)(5),
2604(b)(4)(C), 2605(c)(2)–(3) (2006).
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EPA must follow both the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA’s)
rulemaking requirements, as well as an additional set of requirements
81
that Congress added to those already imposed by the APA. Since
TSCA’s passage, administrative law scholars have observed that courts
have applied and interpreted the APA’s rulemaking requirements to
require strict adherence to numerous procedures, rendering the
rulemaking process increasingly rigid and complicated, even
82
“ossified.” Because TSCA’s procedural requirements are even more
extensive than the procedures required by the APA, TSCA has been
83
called the “ne plus ultra of ossification.” EPA has lamented the fact
that TSCA’s extensive procedural requirements render the use of its
84
available regulatory tools “cumbersome and time-consuming.”
2.

Difficult substantive legal standards
In addition to procedural hurdles, the legal standards contained in
the statute itself also constrain EPA’s ability to address chemical risks.
In enacting TSCA, Congress intended to protect against
“unreasonable” risks to health and the environment, adopting what
has been described as a “probabilistic approach” to the meaning of
85
risk.
Accordingly, TSCA does not instruct EPA to regulate to
86
prevent all risks, but just risks that it determines are “unreasonable.”
This standard is in stark contrast to Congress’s approach in other
preventative regulatory schemes, such as the Delaney Clause of the
87
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. That clause protects against
any risk that a regulated product causes cancer, whether the risk is
88
minute or considerable.
Congress’s approach in TSCA inherently limits EPA’s authority to
regulate chemicals by requiring EPA to first make a finding that a
81. See, e.g., id. § 5(b)(4)(C) (“Any rule promulgated under subparagraph (A) . .
. shall be promulgated pursuant to the procedures specified in section 553 of title 5
[of the APA], except that (i) the Administrator shall give interested persons an
opportunity for the oral presentation of data, views, or arguments, in addition to an
opportunity to make written submissions, (ii) a transcript shall be kept of any oral
presentation, and (iii) the Administrator shall make and publish with the rule the
finding described in subparagraph (A).”).
82. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process,
41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385–86 (1992) (observing how “agencies are beginning to seek
out alternative . . . regulatory vehicles to circumvent the increasingly stiff and
formalized structures of the informal rulemaking process”).
83. Applegate, supra note 17, at 766.
84. Jackson, supra note 78.
85. Applegate, supra note 17, at 728 (emphasis in original omitted).
86. Id. (emphasis in original omitted).
87. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 409(c)(3)(A), 21 U.S.C. §
348(c)(3)(A) (2006).
88. See id. (“[N]o additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to induce
cancer when ingested by man or animal . . . .”).
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chemical poses an “unreasonable risk” before using its authority to
89
ban or limit the chemical. Further, for EPA to use its authority
under section 6—where EPA’s strongest authority under TSCA lies—
after finding that a chemical poses an “unreasonable risk,” Congress
requires EPA to regulate “to protect adequately against such risk
90
using the least burdensome requirements.” Accordingly, Steve Owens,
the EPA official who oversees the Agency’s TSCA implementation,
noted that “[e]ven if EPA has substantial data and wants to protect
the public against known risks, the law creates obstacles to quick and
91
effective regulatory action.”
Invasive judicial review: Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA
Unless stated otherwise, federal agencies’ uses of their statutorily
granted discretion are reviewed under the APA’s “arbitrary and
92
This standard applies to most
capricious” standard of review.
environmental laws; however, Congress chose to require courts to
93
apply a different standard to TSCA. Section 19 of TSCA requires
courts to set aside rules issued by EPA “if the court finds that the rule
94
is not supported by substantial evidence in the rulemaking record.”
The “substantial evidence” standard applies to test rules promulgated
pursuant to section 4, a rule listing dangerous chemicals under
95
section 5, and rules regulating chemicals under section 6.
96
In Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, the Fifth Circuit noted that under
the “substantial evidence” standard of review, even if the challenger
to a rule’s assertions has a solid evidentiary backing, the court will not
overturn the rule as long as “substantial evidence to support [EPA]’s
97
decision” to issue the rule exists. The court also noted that the
substantial evidence standard of review “‘afford[s] a considerably
3.

89. See TSCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006) (stating that EPA can only
regulate a chemical substance under section 6 where it “finds that there is a
reasonable basis to conclude that the manufacture, processing, distribution in
commerce, use, or disposal of a chemical substance . . . presents or will present an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment” (emphasis added)).
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. TSCA Hearings, supra note 9, at 2 (statement of Steve Owens, Assistant
Administrator, Office of Chem. Safety and Pollution Prevention, U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency).
92. See APA § 10(b), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . .
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law .
. . .”).
93. TSCA § 19(c).
94. Id. § 19(c)(1)(B)(i).
95. Id. § 19(c)(1)(A) (limiting judicial review under this standard to actions
taken under sections 4(a), 5(a)(2), 5(b)(4), 6(a), 6(e), and 7).
96. 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
97. Id. at 1213.
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more generous judicial review’ than the arbitrary and capricious
98
test.” This more generous review requires the reviewing court to
strike a balance: the court must carefully scrutinize the agency’s
findings, while showing deference to decisions that are based on the
99
agency’s specific areas of knowledge and experience.
In Corrosion Proof Fittings, the court reviewed a challenge to a rule
issued by EPA pursuant to section 6 of TSCA banning the
“manufacture, importation, processing, and distribution of asbestos
100
in almost all products.” The challengers to EPA’s rule alleged that
it was not based on substantial evidence and should therefore be
101
In evaluating the record presented by EPA, the court
overturned.
applied an invasive review of EPA’s legal obligations under section 6,
which authorizes EPA to regulate a chemical so long as it has a
reasonable basis to conclude that the chemical “will present an
102
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.” Section
6 further requires EPA to use “the least burdensome requirements”
103
to protect against that risk.
The court observed that by choosing to ban asbestos, the most
stringent of EPA’s regulatory options under section 6, “EPA assigned
to itself the toughest burden in satisfying TSCA’s requirement that its
104
alternative be the least burdensome of all those offered to it.” The
court noted that much of the analysis on which EPA based its
decision was correct; this analysis included EPA’s consideration and
rejection of other regulatory options, such as labeling, because these
105
options still exposed the public to too much risk.
However, the
court’s concern was not with the analysis itself, but with EPA’s
106
methodology. In evaluating the manner in which EPA carried out
its section 6 analysis, the court recognized that TSCA required EPA
not only to show that “its proposed action reduce[d] the risk of the
[chemical] to an adequate level, but also that the actions Congress
107
identified as less burdensome also would not do the job.”
The
court then went a step further, requiring that EPA use cost-benefit
108
analysis to make this showing, which the Agency had failed to do.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 1214 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)).
Id.
Id. at 1207.
Id.
TSCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006).
Id.
Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1216.
Id. at 1216.
Id.
Id. at 1217.
See id. (“Upon an initial showing of product danger, the proper course for
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Thus, despite the fact that asbestos was a known carcinogen and
that EPA had spent ten years compiling evidence to support its ban,
the court found that EPA failed to provide substantial evidence that it
109
had chosen the “least burdensome requirement,” and that its
110
The
actions were intended to prevent an “unreasonable risk.”
immediate result of the court’s review was that it remanded the
111
asbestos rule to EPA.
The long-term result of this decision,
however, is that EPA has since never used its section 6 authority to
112
successfully ban a chemical.
C. The Current Landscape
113

Despite its flaws, TSCA’s main title has never been amended.
While EPA struggled to implement TSCA’s main provisions, states
chose to take matters into their own hands, passing state laws
regulating chemicals as increasing numbers of threats from chemical
114
substances came to light. Congress, on the other hand, made little
progress to change TSCA until 2009, when the United States House
of Representatives and Senate both seriously considered legislation
115
that would substantially reform the current law.
In addition to
advocating for reform, in 2009 the Obama Administration EPA
announced its intention to chart a new path under the current
116
statute, pledging to aggressively enforce its existing TSCA authority.
State actions, the pending reform legislation, and EPA’s current
TSCA trajectory are discussed below.
EPA to follow is to consider each regulatory option, beginning with the least
burdensome, and the costs and benefits of regulation under each option.”).
109. Id. at 1229–30. The court focused on the fact that in choosing the ban, “EPA
presented two comparisons[:] . . . a world with no further regulation under TSCA,
and a world in which no manufacture of asbestos takes place. The EPA rejected
calculating how many lives a less burdensome regulation would save, and at what
cost.” Id. at 1216. The court held that EPA’s failure to show “that the actions
Congress identified [in section 6] as less burdensome also would not do the job”
amounted to a “failure to meet its burden of showing that its actions . . . reduce the
risk . . . in the Congressionally-mandated least burdensome fashion.” Id. at 1217.
110. TSCA does not define the term “unreasonable risk.” Therefore, in Corrosion
Proof Fittings the court analogized to other statutes where Congress directed agencies
to act to prevent “unreasonable risks.” Id. at 1222. The court reasoned that
“unreasonable risk” “necessarily involves a balancing test” whereby EPA must analyze
the costs and benefits of any action taken to prevent such a risk. Id.
111. Id. at 1228.
112. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 75, at 58–60 (describing
bans of polychlorinated biphenyls, fully halogenated chlorofluoroalkanes, dioxin,
asbestos, and hexavalent chromium, all of which EPA imposed before the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in Corrosion Proof Fittings).
113. TSCA §§ 1–30, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–29 (2006).
114. See infra Part I.C.1.
115. See infra Part I.C.2.
116. See infra Part I.C.3.
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1.

State responses to stymied federal action
In 2007, bisphenol A (BPA), a chemical used to make hard plastics
such as baby bottles and sports bottles, made headlines across the
117
country. A U.S. government-sponsored panel found that exposure
through ingesting liquid housed in a plastic container made with BPA
was linked to neurological and behavioral effects in developing
fetuses, and required further study to determine the effects on
118
adults.
In addition to the firestorm of media coverage, the
119
troubling findings about BPA’s likely toxicity spurred eight states to
ban this chemical as the federal government evaluated its options;
120
federal regulation of BPA under TSCA is still pending.
State action to regulate toxic chemicals goes beyond the recent
series of laws passed in response to the risks of BPA. A November
2010 report based on a nationwide survey of state toxics regulation
found that “18 states have passed 71 chemical safety laws in the last
121
eight years by an overwhelming, bipartisan margin.”
The report
points to three primary factors that have led to both the prevalence
and success of state laws regulating chemicals: “growing scientific
evidence of harm, strong public outcry, and Congress’s failure to act
122
[to reform TSCA].” States’ ability to pass laws regulating chemicals
in the face of federal inaction is also due to TSCA’s express
123
preemption provision.
The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution mandates that
117. See, e.g., Steven Reinberg, Plastics Chemical of ‘Some Concern’ for Fetal, Child
Health, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/08/08/AR2007080802060.html (reporting that “[a]nimal
experiments have suggested that BPA may mimic the female sex hormone
estradiol”); Lisa Stiffler, Are Plastic Bottles Dangerous?, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Aug. 8, 2007, http://www.seattlepi.com/local/326907_plastic09.html (noting that
the same week that the federal study related to risks of BPA was released, another
study came out which found that BPA risks were negligible). Since the initial
attention to BPA in 2007, researchers continue to explore the chemical’s risks, and
some advocate for a federal ban. See Elizabeth Kolbert, A Warning by Key Researcher on
Risks of BPA in Our Lives, YALE ENV’T 360 (Nov. 24, 2010), http://e360.yale.edu/
feature/a_warning_by_key_researcher_on_risks_of_bpa_in_our_lives/2344/
(likening BPA to a known carcinogen and hormonal disrupting chemical called DES,
which was administered to women in the 1950s and then banned when it became
known that DES caused serious reproductive disorders and elevated cancer levels).
118. Reinberg, supra note 117.
119. See Jane Houlihan et al., Timeline: BPA from Invention to Phase-Out, ENVTL.
WORKING GRP., http://www.ewg.org/reports/bpatimeline (last updated Mar. 2011)
(chronicling state action on BPA). To date, California, Connecticut, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Washington, and Wisconsin have issued full or
partial BPA bans. Id.
120. See infra Part I.C.3.
121. BELLIVEAU, supra note 13, at 26.
122. Id. at 7.
123. TSCA § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a) (2006).
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“[w]here a state statute conflicts with, or frustrates, federal law, the
124
However, courts must not declare that a
former must give way.”
state law is preempted unless Congress clearly intended for the
125
federal law to be preeminent.
To determine whether Congress
intended for a federal act to preempt the states’ powers, courts
should first look to “the plain wording” of a statute’s express
preemption clause, which contains the most conclusive evidence of
126
Congress’s intent.
TSCA contains such an express preemption
provision; thus, this provision is where courts will begin their review
127
in deciding whether a state law is preempted by TSCA.
TSCA’s preemption provision, located in section 18 of the statute,
states that “nothing in this chapter shall affect the authority of any
State or political subdivision of a State to establish or continue in
128
effect regulation of any chemical substance.”
There are two
exceptions to this provision: (1) where EPA has issued a section 4
test rule for a substance, a state’s ability to establish or continue a
testing requirement for the same substance or mixture is
129
preempted; and (2) where EPA has issued a rule or order under
section 5 or section 6, any state requirement applying to the same
substance must be either identical to or more stringent than the
130
federal rule. Thus, where EPA has not regulated a chemical, states
131
are free to regulate it as they wish.
Where EPA has regulated a
chemical under section 5 or section 6, states can do so as well—so
long as the states’ requirements are at least as protective as the
132
federal requirement.
2.

Brief overview of House and Senate reform bills
133
In April 2010, following the rising tide of state legislation,
coupled with intense pressure from environmental and health

124. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 663 (1993).
125. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
126. CSX Transp., 507 U.S. at 664.
127. See id. (explaining a court’s task in making a preemption determination when
dealing with a statute containing an express preemption clause).
128. TSCA § 18(a)(1).
129. Id. § 18(a)(2)(A).
130. See id. § 18(a)(2)(B) (providing that where EPA has regulated a chemical
under section 5 or section 6, a state regulation that differs from the federal rule will
avoid preemption so long as it bans that chemical).
131. Id. § 18(a).
132. States can either regulate to the same extent that the federal government has
or go a step further and ban the substance entirely. Id. § 18(a)(2)(B).
133. See BELLIVEAU, supra note 13, at 12 (detailing how the rate of policymaking
has tripled since 2003, such that by 2010, state legislatures passed fourteen state toxic
chemical laws per year compared with four laws per year in 2003).
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134

Senator Frank R. Lautenberg introduced
advocacy groups,
135
In July 2010,
legislation to reform TSCA in the Senate.
Representatives Henry A. Waxman and Bobby Rush introduced their
136
own version of such legislation in the House.
In April 2011,
137
Senator Lautenberg reintroduced his legislation. The current bills,
entitled the “Safe Chemicals Act of 2011” in the Senate and the
138
“Toxic Chemicals Safety Act of 2010” in the House, are similar;
both attempt to address what have been identified as the “core
139
failings” of TSCA.
The proposed reform legislation amends the core provisions of
TSCA to give EPA greater flexibility and authority to regulate
140
chemical risks. The reform bills would change section 4 of TSCA to
require that manufacturers and processors send a “minimum data
141
set” to EPA without EPA having to require them to do so by rule.

134. See, e.g., Molly Gray, When It Comes to Chemicals, “Safe Until Proven Harmful” Isn’t
Good Enough for My Baby and Me, SAFER CHEMICALS, HEALTHY FAMILIES BLOG (Feb. 4,
2010),
http://blog.saferchemicals.org/2010/02/when-it-comes-to-chemicals-safeuntil-proven-harmful-isnt-good-enough-for-my-baby-and-me.html (describing how
test results in a study of nine pregnant women showed the author had chemical
exposure above the national average despite doing “everything [she] could to reduce
[her] exposure to toxic chemicals”); Linda Greer, Part I: Stemming the Tide of Toxic
Chemicals, SWITCHBOARD (Mar. 2, 2009), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/
lgreer/part_i_stemming_the_tide_of_to.html (arguing that “President Obama and
his new, more progressive government will not be able to fix the mess [caused by
toxic chemicals]” because “many problems in current policy have their origins in the
fundamental weakness of the main federal law intended to comprehensively regulate
the use of toxic chemicals”).
135. Safe Chemicals Act of 2010, S. 3209, 111th Cong.
136. Toxic Chemicals Safety Act of 2010, H.R. 5820, 111th Cong.
137. Safe Chemicals Act of 2011, S. 847, 112th Cong.
138. See Summary and Comparison of the TSCA Reform Legislation, BERGESON &
CAMPBELL, P.C. (Apr. 27, 2010), http://www.lawbc.com/regulatory-developments/
entry/summary-and-comparison-of-the-tsca-reform-legislation/ (summarizing the
Discussion Draft of the House bill and noting the differences between the House and
Senate bill, of which there are few). Though this comparison addressed the original
2010 Senate bill, the portions of the 2011 bill addressed in this Comment have not
changed significantly since the 2010 version.
139. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Press Release, Senator Frank
R. Lautenberg, Sen. Lautenberg Introduces “Safe Chemicals Act of 2011” (Apr. 14,
2011), http://lautenberg.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=332785& (“[The]
‘Safe Chemicals Act of 2011’ would require safety testing of all industrial chemicals,
and puts the burden on industry to prove that chemicals are safe in order stay on the
market. Under current policy, the [EPA] can only call for safety testing after
evidence surfaces demonstrating a chemical is dangerous.”).
140. Press Release, Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, supra note 139.
141. See S. 847 § 4(a)(2) (requiring manufacturers to submit data to EPA for both
new and existing chemicals); H.R. 5820 § 4(a)(2) (also requiring manufacturers to
submit data for both new and existing chemicals). Further, the proposed section 4
would also give EPA the authority to require testing beyond the “minimum data set”
via orders, thus circumventing the extensive requirements that come with
rulemaking. S. 847 § 4(b)(1)(A) (allowing EPA to require testing “by rule or order”
(emphasis added)); H.R. 5820 § 4(b) (entitled “Testing Rules and Orders”).

TREVISAN.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

3/26/2012 8:12 PM

HUMAN HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT CAN’T WAIT

405

The bills would also change section 5 of TSCA to further shift the
burden of proof from EPA to manufacturers: rather than approving
chemicals absent EPA action, both new and existing chemicals could
not be manufactured unless EPA determines that such chemicals
142
meet safety standards set by the Agency. Under section 6, the new
legislation affords EPA significantly more leeway to regulate
dangerous chemicals; specifically, EPA would no longer have to
143
choose the “least burdensome requirements” when regulating.
Lastly, judicial review under the reform bills would be subject to the
APA “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review, rather than the
144
“substantial evidence” standard.
In short, both bills attempt to
remove the procedural and legal obstacles that have plagued TSCA.
3.

The Obama EPA’s aggressive new approach to its TSCA authority
Current EPA officials have been among the most vocal proponents
145
of TSCA reform. However, in addition to pushing Congress to pass
a new law, the current EPA has also pledged to aggressively use the
146
TSCA authority that it currently possesses. In September 2009, EPA
unveiled its plans to regulate what it considers to be some of the
greatest chemical threats that are currently unregulated under TSCA
147
in a series of “Chemical Action Plans.”
These plans have been
described as “almost breathtaking in scope” and are unprecedented
148
in the history of EPA’s implementation of TSCA. Part II argues that
142. S. 847 § 6(b)(1)(B)(i), (b)(3)(B); H.R. 5820 § 6(b)(2).
143. Compare S. 847 § 6(c) (authorizing EPA to manage risks of toxic chemicals
through options such as outright bans or warning label requirements, without
imposing a “least burdensome alternative” requirement), and H.R. 5820 § 6(c)
(same), with TSCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006) (requiring that EPA protect
against chemical risk using the “least burdensome requirements”).
144. See S. 847 § 19 (noting that relief should be granted in accordance with
“chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code,” i.e. the APA, located at 5 U.S.C. § 706);
H.R. 5820 § 19 (also requiring that judicial review follow the provisions of the APA).
145. See Current Science on Public Exposures to Toxic Chemicals Before the Subcomm. on
Superfund, Toxics, and Envtl. Health of the S. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 111th
Cong. 2 (2010), available at http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=
Files.View&FileStore_id=1ce6689c-cf2c-4ced-a4f0-524283f4add8 (statement of Steve
Owens, Assistant Administrator, Office of Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic
Substances, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency) (testifying that “EPA’s authority is outdated and
does not provide the tools to adequately protect human health and the
environment”); see also TSCA Hearings, supra note 9, at 5 (statement of Steve Owens,
Assistant Administrator, Office of Chem. Safety and Pollution Prevention, U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency) (observing that the House Toxic Chemicals Safety Act, “if enacted,
would substantially update and modernize TSCA”).
146. Enhancing EPA’s Chemical Management Program, supra note 13.
147. Id. (noting that “EPA is developing chemical action plans which will target the
Agency’s risk management efforts on chemicals of concern” (emphasis added)).
148. See Charles Auer et al., EPA’s Action Plans Signal a New Chapter for TSCA While
Informing the Future Legislative Debate on Chemicals, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,243, 10,243
(2010) (noting that “EPA has never previously announced so many actions under
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a number of the actions proposed by EPA have potential to both
effectuate TSCA’s goals and to withstand court challenges. These
actions include EPA’s authority (1) to require chemical testing under
section 4(a)(1)(B); (2) to create a list of chemicals that pose a
potential threat to health and the environment pursuant to section
5(b)(4)(A); and (3) to regulate dangerous chemicals under section
149
6.
These actions are in various stages of implementation. Pursuant to
its section 4(a)(1)(B) authority, on January 7, 2011, EPA issued a
final rule requiring the manufacturers of nineteen chemicals that the
Agency found were produced in “substantial quantities” and resulted
in “substantial human exposure,” and for which little to no data is
currently available, to test the chemicals’ effects on health and the
150
environment.
In contrast, EPA has not yet issued its Chemicals of
Concern list—which it has authority to issue pursuant to section
5(b)(4)(A)—as a final rule since it initially proposed the rule in April
151
2010. Lastly, EPA has yet to take any final action using its section 6
authority; however, as is explained in Part II.C, EPA should not be
152
dissuaded from using this authority by current precedent.
II. WAYS IN WHICH EPA CAN MAKE (AND IS MAKING) THE MOST OF
ITS AUTHORITY UNDER TSCA TO PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE
ENVIRONMENT
Despite its procedural and substantive hurdles, TSCA still presents
opportunities for EPA to act now to minimize chemical risks. EPA
has identified several areas of the statute that offer regulatory
[TSCA], nor has it ever cited use of § 6 so widely”).
149. Infra Part II.
150. See Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals; Second Group of
Chemicals, 76 Fed. Reg. 1067, 1069 (Jan. 7, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9,
799).
151. See RegInfo.gov, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/
do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201010&RIN=2070-AJ70 (last visited Oct. 2, 2011)
(“EPA is proposing to add a category of eight phthalates, a category of
polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs), and bisphenol A (BPA) to a list of
chemical substances that EPA finds present an unreasonable risk of injury to human
health or the environment.”).
152. This Comment acknowledges that it is likely, based on the terms of TSCA’s
judicial review provision, that any EPA rule banning a chemical substance would be
reviewed by the Fifth Circuit, for which Corrosion Proof Fittings is binding authority.
See TSCA § 19(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 2618(a)(1)(A) (2006) (allowing parties to file a
petition for review in the Court of Appeals with jurisdiction over the area “in which
such person’s principal place of business is located”). Notably, many chemical
manufacturers operate facilities in the states that make up the Fifth Circuit. In Part
II.C, this Comment lays out an argument for why the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Corrosion Proof Fittings was erroneous and thus argues that any reviewing court should
not rely on that decision (and in the case of the Fifth Circuit, should overturn it).
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153

These
potential in its proposed Chemical Action Plans.
opportunities are present in areas of the statute where courts have
154
afforded EPA relative leeway in using its authority.
They are also
present in provisions of TSCA that EPA has never used before, but
155
are well within its authority. Lastly, they are present in areas of the
law that are long overdue for reexamination; specifically, it is time for
156
a reinterpretation of EPA’s authority under section 6.
Actions in each of these areas present an avenue for EPA to realize
some of the promise that remains in the current law. Further, all of
the foregoing actions are within the Agency’s legal authority under
TSCA and, when carried out in accordance with the statute, should
be able to withstand likely court challenges and help effectuate
TSCA’s purpose of protecting human health and the environment
from chemical risks.
While TSCA certainly presents some
opportunities beyond the scope of this Comment, the following
methods of regulation each represent a significant step toward
making TSCA work now.
A. EPA Can Take Advantage of Relatively Broad Judicial Interpretations of
Its Section 4 Authority to Fill in Information Gaps Regarding Chemical Risk
According to commentators, one of TSCA’s greatest failures is that
it has not produced the comprehensive chemical health and safety
157
data that Congress envisioned when it passed the statute.
Largely
because the statute does not create an affirmative duty for
manufacturers to test chemicals—rather, manufacturers are only
legally required to perform tests when EPA issues a test rule—
“troubling gaps” are present in EPA’s current universe of data on
158
chemical risks.
However, section 4(a)(1)(B) of TSCA presents an
opportunity for EPA to issue rules that will generate health and safety
information about some of the most prevalent chemicals on the
market, for which data is currently lacking. As a result of EPA’s
159
recently issued section 4(a)(1)(B) rule, manufacturers of nineteen
153. See Existing Chemicals Action Plans, supra note 147 (describing how EPA is
deciding what chemicals to select for action plans based on factors like “[h]igh
production,” “consumer products,” and “[c]hemicals subject to review and potential
action in international forums”).
154. Infra Part II.A.
155. Infra Part II.B.
156. See infra Part II.C (discussing the only judicial interpretation of EPA’s section
6 authority to date).
157. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 75, at 19 (noting that EPA
has made “little progress” in reviewing chemical risks since it first began chemical
review in 1979).
158. Jackson, supra note 78.
159. Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals; Second Group of
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highly prevalent chemicals will be required for the first time to
perform tests to determine the chemicals’ overall toxicity, including
“[d]evelopmental and reproductive toxicity” and “[g]enetic
160
EPA can then use this data, and data generated from
toxicity.”
similar future rules, to make fully informed decisions about how to
161
handle any risks posed by these prevalent chemicals.
For the
following reasons, if EPA’s recently issued rule or similar future rules
are challenged, a court will likely uphold such rules as valid exercises
of EPA authority.
In accordance with the Supreme Court’s holding in Chevron, a
court will likely defer to EPA’s construction of the requirements for
162
issuing a section 4(a)(1)(B) rule. To issue a rule under this section,
the statute requires that EPA determine (1) that the chemicals being
regulated enter the environment in “substantial quantities,” or are
produced in “substantial quantities” and result in “substantial human
exposure,” and (2) whether testing is necessary to fill in gaps in
163
knowledge about the effects of the tested chemical.
However,
neither TSCA nor its legislative history defines what quantities of
chemical or what level of human or environmental exposure suffice
164
to be considered “substantial.”
Because Congress left these terms
undefined in the statute, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Chevron is
165
applicable here.
In Chevron, the Court held that where a statute is silent or
ambiguous as to a particular term in a statute delegating authority to
an agency to make rules carrying the force of law, an agency has

Chemicals, 76 Fed. Reg. 1067, 1067 (Jan. 7, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9,
799).
160. Id. at 1069.
161. If, based on the data that EPA receives as a result of testing mandated by
section 4(a)(1)(B) rules, EPA finds that a chemical “presents or will present an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment,” TSCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. §
2605 (2006), it can then regulate that chemical pursuant to section 6 of TSCA. Id.
To date, EPA has proposed an additional rule that would require manufacturers of
another set of high production volume chemicals to submit test data to the Agency.
Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals; Third Group of Chemicals,
75 Fed. Reg. 8575, 8575 (Feb. 25, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 799).
162. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to
an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer.”).
163. TSCA § 4(a)(1)(B).
164. See id. § 3 (lacking “substantial” in “Definitions” section); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v.
EPA, 899 F.2d 344, 353 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that “TSCA contains no definition of
‘substantial,’ nor does its legislative history”).
165. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (asserting that “if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute”).

TREVISAN.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

3/26/2012 8:12 PM

HUMAN HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT CAN’T WAIT

409

implicit authority to define that term, and any reasonable
166
interpretation by the agency should be upheld. Further, the Court
also held that where Congress “left a gap” for the agency to fill,
Congress explicitly delegated to the agency the authority to define a
167
statutory term. In section 4(a)(1)(B), Congress seemingly left such
a gap for EPA to fill by requiring EPA to issue a test rule if it
determines that a chemical is produced in “substantial quantities”
and enters the environment in “substantial quantities,” without
168
defining what a “substantial quantity” is.
Thus, under Chevron, a
court should uphold EPA’s interpretation of these terms unless it is
based on an impermissible or unreasonable construction of the
169
statute.
Accordingly, in Chemical Manufacturers, the Fifth Circuit held that
by failing to define what amount of chemical constitutes a
“substantial quantity” and what level of human exposure is
“substantial” for purposes of triggering section 4(a)(1)(B), Congress
170
gave EPA “considerable latitude” to define these terms.
Though
the court did not cite to Chevron in that decision, the court’s holding
reflected the deference required by the Supreme Court in Chevron
171
and its progeny.
Thus, in accordance with both the Supreme
Court’s holding in Chevron and the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Chemical
172
Manufacturers,
the interpretation of “substantial quantity” and
“substantial human exposure” espoused by EPA in its 1993 guidance
173
document, as incorporated by reference in EPA’s recently issued
174
section 4(a)(1)(B) test rules, should be the standard to which a
166. Id. at 843–44.
167. Id.
168. TSCA § 4(a)(1)(B).
169. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
170. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 899 F.2d 344, 359 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation
omitted).
171. Compare Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (requiring that courts first ask whether
Congress has directly addressed the issue, and if not, whether the agency permissibly
interpreted the statute), with Chem. Mfrs., 899 F.2d at 354 (observing that Congress
did not define the term in the statute, and that the court would uphold EPA’s
interpretation as long as it was consistent with the statutory scheme).
172. Chem. Mfrs., 899 F.2d at 354.
173. See TSCA Section 4(a)(1)(B) Final Statement of Policy; Criteria for
Evaluating Substantial Production, Substantial Release, and Substantial or Significant
Human Exposure, 58 Fed. Reg. 28,736, 28,736 (May 14, 1993) (stating that the
purpose of the 1993 guidance document is to establish “threshold amounts to make
‘substantial’ production, release, and human exposure findings under TSCA section
4(a)(1)(B)”).
174. In its section 4(a)(1)(B) test rule, EPA sets out its interpretation of the
meaning of “substantial quantity” and “substantial human exposure” by
incorporating the interpretation espoused by the Agency in its 1993 guidance
document. See Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals; Second
Group of Chemicals, 76 Fed. Reg. 1067, 1072 (Jan. 7, 2011) (to be codified at 40
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court looks in determining whether these two threshold
175
requirements for a new test rule have been met.
In TSCA’s legislative history, Congress was “permissive and
expansive” in defining EPA’s discretion to interpret these terms,
further supporting EPA’s broad grant of authority to define what is
176
required to satisfy the section 4(a)(1)(B) test rule requirements.
Chevron demands only that an agency’s interpretation be a reasonable
or “permissible construction” of the statute that the agency is charged
177
with administering.
As EPA based its interpretation of the terms
“substantial quantity” and “substantial human exposure” on its
178
expertise and knowledge of chemical risks, courts will likely uphold
its interpretation as a valid interpretation of section 4(a)(1)(B).
EPA determined in both its guidance document and its recent rule
that TSCA contemplates a “substantial quantity” as being more than
179
one million pounds per year; production of each of the chemicals
C.F.R. pts. 9, 799) (restating the definition of “substantial quantities” used in EPA’s
1993 guidance document and noting that “EPA believes that in general an
environmental release of a chemical substance in an amount equal to or greater than
1 million lbs per year or greater than 10% of the reported production volume is
‘substantial’ as that term is used with reference to ‘enter the environment in
substantial quantities’ in TSCA section 4(a)(1)(B)(i)”); see also TSCA Section
4(a)(1)(B) Final Statement of Policy; Criteria for Evaluating Substantial Production,
Substantial Release, and Substantial or Significant Human Exposure, 58 Fed. Reg. at
28,736. Thus, while the Supreme Court held in Mead that agency guidance
documents are not entitled to the same level of deference as agency rules intended
to carry the force of law, the Court’s analysis in Mead is inapplicable here as EPA set
out its interpretation of these terms in its guidance document within its rulemaking.
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30 (2001) (observing that while
Chevron deference does not apply to agency pronouncements that do not carry the
force of law, such as guidance documents, “a very good indicat[ion] of delegation
meriting Chevron treatment i[s] express congressional authorizations to engage in
the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for
which deference is claimed”). Thus, here, EPA is entitled to Chevron deference, and
not the lower level of deference revived by the Court in Mead, as EPA’s interpretation
is in an area of the statute where Congress delegated to EPA the authority to make
binding regulations. See id.
175. Chem. Mfrs., 899 F.2d at 359.
176. Id. at 355 n.15, 356 n.16 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1341, at 18 (1976), reprinted
in H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT, at 425 (Comm. Print 1976)).
177. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
178. TSCA Section 4(a)(1)(B) Final Statement of Policy; Criteria for Evaluating
Substantial Production, Substantial Release, and Substantial or Significant Human
Exposure, 58 Fed. Reg. at 28,736. Further, CMA acknowledged in its comments that
EPA’s determination that production of one million pounds of a chemical was a
“substantial quantity” was reasonable. Id. at 28,739.
179. Id.; see also Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals; Second
Group of Chemicals, 76 Fed. Reg. 1067, 1071–72 (Jan. 7, 2011) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 9, 799) (restating the definition of “substantial quantities” used in EPA’s
1993 guidance document and commenting that “EPA believes that in general an
environmental release of a chemical substance in an amount equal to or greater than
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180

In addition, EPA
regulated in EPA’s rule exceeds this amount.
found that all nineteen chemicals met the requisite level of exposure
to be considered “substantial” in the employment context, which is
181
exposure of over 1000 workers to a chemical substance. Based on
EPA’s discretion to define these terms in its rulemaking, a court will
likely determine that EPA has met the first two requirements to
trigger its section 4(a)(1)(B) authority.
However, to withstand judicial review, EPA must also show that its
182
determinations are supported by substantial evidence in the record.
In the test rule, EPA included extensive information to support its
findings that the chemicals subject to the rule are produced in
183
“substantial quantities” and result in “substantial human exposure.”
Namely, EPA noted that its estimates of the quantity of chemicals
produced, as well as the exposure of workers to the chemicals, are
based on information that manufacturers submitted to EPA pursuant
184
to section 8(a) of TSCA, which requires manufacturers to report
current data on the volume of chemicals they produce to EPA every
185
four years.
In Chemical Manufacturers, the Fifth Circuit held that where EPA
had scientific studies to support its finding that three million pounds
of cumene entered the atmosphere, and where CMA failed to show
186
that such findings were “fatally flawed,” EPA’s determination was a
“reasonable ball-park estimate” supported by substantial evidence in
187
the record.
Here, unlike in Chemical Manufacturers where EPA’s
188
studies were in conflict with CMA’s, EPA based its estimates of the
quantities of chemicals produced and released on the manufacturers’
189
own data.
Thus, in its January 2011 rule, EPA’s determination of
1 million lbs per year or greater than 10% of the reported production volume is
‘substantial’ as that term is used with reference to ‘enter the environment in
substantial quantities’ in TSCA section 4(a)(1)(B)(i)”).
180. Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals; Second Group of
Chemicals, 76 Fed. Reg. at 1070.
181. Id.
182. TSCA § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2618(c) (2006).
183. Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals; Second Group of
Chemicals, 76 Fed. Reg. at 1069–71.
184. See id. at 1071–72 (noting that production and worker exposure data “is
based, in large part, on information submitted in accordance with the 2006 [section
8(a) Inventory Update Rule]”).
185. This requirement is known as the Inventory Update Rule (IUR). See TSCA §
8(a); 40 C.F.R. §§ 710.25, 33 (2010).
186. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 899 F.2d 344, 352 (5th Cir. 1990).
187. Id. at 353.
188. Id. at 352 (recognizing that “EPA identified sufficient defects in the CMA
study to justify a determination not to rely on it”).
189. Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals; Second Group of
Chemicals, 76 Fed. Reg. at 1071 (noting that EPA’s finding regarding the production
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the amount of chemicals produced should logically be the same as
the manufacturers’, as EPA based its production estimates on data
190
submitted by the manufacturers themselves.
It follows that EPA’s
estimates of the “substantial quantities” of chemicals produced are
191
even closer to the mark than a “reasonable ball-park estimate” —
they are manufacturers’ actual production figures.
Similarly, EPA’s estimate of the “substantial human exposure”
resulting from the use of these nineteen chemicals is also based in
192
large part on data sent to EPA by the manufacturers themselves.
However, unlike production information (for which manufacturers
are the seemingly most authoritative source), the worker exposure
data that the manufacturers sent to EPA was submitted only “to the
193
extent the information was readily obtainable.” While in the Fifth
Circuit Chemical Manufacturers case CMA attempted to debunk EPA’s
estimate of the amount of cumene released with CMA’s own
194
drastically lower estimate, to the extent that the manufacturers
submitted worker exposure data to EPA, EPA’s estimates and the
manufacturers’ estimates will largely match up and therefore should
not be challenged.
However, for chemicals for which manufacturers did not submit
195
worker exposure data, EPA also based its exposure estimates on
National Occupational Exposure Survey (NOES) data developed by
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, and EPA
196
analyzed this data in its rule.
In Chemical Manufacturers, the Fifth
Circuit noted that EPA is not required to determine exact quantities
in estimating the human exposure or environmental release of a
chemical, but rather that a “reasonable ball-park estimate” is
197
acceptable, and “rough approximation suffices.”
Here, where
EPA’s estimate that at least 1000 workers are exposed to each of the
nineteen chemicals is based on data from the chemical
manufacturers as well as the NOES data and the Agency’s own
of the nineteen chemicals subject to the rule was “based on information gathered
pursuant to the 2006 IUR,” which requires manufacturers to submit production data
to EPA).
190. Id.
191. Chem. Mfrs., 899 F.2d at 353.
192. Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals; Second Group of
Chemicals, 76 Fed. Reg. at 1071.
193. Id.
194. Chem. Mfrs., 899 F.2d at 349–50.
195. It is not clear from the rule for which chemicals this is true. See Testing of
Certain High Production Volume Chemicals; Second Group of Chemicals, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 1071.
196. Id.
197. Chem. Mfrs., 899 F.2d at 352–53.
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analysis, a court will likely find that EPA has supported its estimate
with substantial evidence in the record.
In short, in its recently issued rule EPA has shown—using
substantial evidence—that the nineteen chemicals subject to the rule
are produced in “substantial quantities” and result in “substantial
198
human exposure.” EPA has also substantiated the fact that the last
two of the four triggers for its use of section 4(a)(1)(B) have been
met: (1) there is currently insufficient data for these chemicals; and
199
(2) testing is necessary to develop that data.
EPA determined,
based on “searches for data” and the “review of studies/data
identified by commenters [to the rule],” that the data the Agency is
200
looking for is unavailable.
In Chemical Manufacturers, the CMA did not challenge, and
therefore the Fifth Circuit did not analyze, EPA’s finding with regard
201
to these last two requirements of section 4(a)(1)(B).
However,
where, as here, EPA has substantiated its determination that the data
the Agency is seeking is currently nonexistent, a court will likely
uphold the Agency’s findings based on the deference shown to EPA
in Chemical Manufacturers with regard to the first two triggers of
section 4(a)(1)(B). Where the Fifth Circuit in Chemical Manufacturers
found that “rough approximation” sufficed with regard to EPA’s
estimates for the quantity of chemicals produced and the level of
202
exposure, a court is likely to find that EPA’s searching attempt to
find the requested data and subsequent determination that it “knows
203
of no other means to generate [this data] other than the testing,”
amounts to substantial evidence that testing is necessary.
Accordingly, a court is likely to uphold EPA’s recently issued rule as a
valid exercise of the Agency’s section 4(a)(1)(B) authority. So long
as EPA similarly substantiates its findings in future rules with regard
to the four requirements of this section, these rules will likely be
upheld as well.
Section 4(a)(1)(B) provides EPA with an opportunity to issue rules
to fill in gaps concerning the effects of some of the most prevalent
chemicals in society. By issuing its recent rule to obtain missing
information about nineteen chemicals produced in quantities of over
198. Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals; Second Group of
Chemicals, 76 Fed. Reg. at 1071–72.
199. Id. at 1072–73.
200. Id.
201. Chem. Mfrs., 899 F.2d at 352 n.12.
202. Id. at 352–53.
203. Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals; Second Group of
Chemicals, 76 Fed. Reg. at 1073.
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one million pounds per year, and by issuing similar additional rules,
EPA can gather currently unknown information about the health and
safety risks of chemicals produced on a massive scale. The health and
safety information that EPA gains from issuing section 4(a)(1)(B) test
rules can serve as a step toward reducing the risks from these highly
prevalent chemicals preemptively, before their risks place the public
or environment’s health in jeopardy.
B. Section 5 Presents New Opportunities to Raise Public Awareness About
Chemical Risks
Another frequent criticism of TSCA is that the statute fails to give
EPA sufficient guidance on the prioritization of chemicals that
205
require regulatory action.
EPA has proposed using section
206
5(b)(4)(A) of TSCA to create a Chemicals of Concern list, which
would help draw attention to particularly dangerous chemicals, as
207
well as identify chemicals that are priorities for potential regulation.
As section 5(b)(4)(A) is an area of the statute where courts are likely
to show EPA significant deference, this section presents an
opportunity for EPA to draw attention to the risk factors of a wide
range of chemicals.
208
To date, EPA has never used section 5(b)(4)(A) of TSCA, and
thus no current court precedent exists interpreting this section’s
primary requirement: that EPA may add chemicals to such a list so
long as it finds that they present an “unreasonable risk” of injury to
209
human health or the environment. Though “unreasonable risk” is
210
not defined in the statute, courts have interpreted this term in the
context of section 4(a)(1)(A) of TSCA and have shown substantial

204. Id. at 1072–73.
205. See Mark A. Greenwood, TSCA Reform: Building a Program That Can Work, 39
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,034, 10,036 (2009) (recognizing that “[i]t is unrealistic to expect a
new TSCA program to review all chemicals under the statute’s jurisdiction”).
206. See TSCA Section 5(b)(4) Concern List, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/oppt/existingchemicals/pubs/sect5b4.html (last updated Apr.
28, 2010) (providing that EPA will compile and maintain the list through
“rulemaking proceedings with opportunity for notice and comment”).
207. See Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Announces Actions to
Address Chemicals of Concern, Including Phthalates: Agency Continues Efforts to
Work for Comprehensive Reform of Toxic Substance Laws (Dec. 30, 2009),
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/2852C60DC0F65C688525769C0068B
219 (recognizing that 60,000 chemicals were listed in the EPA inventory when TSCA
was passed in 1976, and since then over 20,000 new chemicals have been created).
208. See Auer et al., supra note 148, at 10,244 (observing that while “the George W.
Bush Administration raised the possibility of using the § 5(b)(4) listing,” the
“[chemical] industry raised a number of ‘black list’ concerns in its comments”).
209. TSCA § 5(b)(4)(A)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(b)(4)(A)(i) (2006).
210. Id. § 3.
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deference to EPA in the process. As explained in the following
analysis, it is likely that a court will show similar deference to EPA in
evaluating its determination of “unreasonable risk” for purposes of
adding a chemical to a section 5(b)(4)(A) Chemicals of Concern list.
Principles of statutory interpretation, as espoused by the Supreme
Court, dictate that courts generally presume that a word or term
usually carries the same meaning when it occurs more than once in a
211
single statute.
Both section 5(b)(4)(A) and section 4(a)(1)(A)
contain identical language that permits EPA to issue a rule—either
listing a chemical in the 5(b)(4)(A) context or requiring a
manufacturer to test a chemical in the section 4(a)(1)(A) context—
only when EPA determines that a chemical presents an
212
“unreasonable risk” of injury to human health or the environment.
However, the presumption that identical terms will be given identical
meanings “yields whenever there is such variation in the connection
in which the words are used . . . to warrant the conclusion that they
213
were employed in different parts of the act with different intent.”
TSCA’s legislative history is evidence that Congress intended for
EPA to apply the term “unreasonable risk” in section 4(a)(1)(A) and
214
section 5(b)(4)(A) in the same manner. The House Report on the
bill noted that while “unreasonable risk” is used throughout the
statute as the standard for defining the regulatory authority of the
Administrator, the implementation of the standard will necessarily
“vary depending on the specific regulatory authority which the

211. See Entvl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007) (“[W]e
presume that the same term has the same meaning when it occurs here and there in
a single statute . . . .”). However, the Court notes later in its opinion that this
presumption is not irrefutable and can be overcome by evidence of Congressional
intent to the contrary. Id. at 574.
212. Compare TSCA § 5(b)(4)(A)(i) (“The Administrator may, by rule, compile
and keep current a list of chemical substances with respect to which the
Administrator finds that the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use,
or disposal, or any combination of such activities, presents or may present an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.” (emphasis added)), with id. §
4(a) (“If the Administrator finds that . . . the manufacture, distribution in commerce,
processing, use, or disposal of a chemical substance or mixture, or that any
combination of such activities, may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment . . . [along with additional requirements] the Administrator shall by rule
require that testing be conducted . . . .” (emphasis added)).
213. Envtl. Def., 549 U.S. at 574 (quoting Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United
States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
214. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1341, at 13–14 (1976), reprinted in H. COMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TOXIC
SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT, at 421–22 (Comm. Print 1976) (“[T]he determination of
unreasonable risk involves a consideration of probability, severity, and similar factors
which cannot be defined in precise terms and is not a factual determination but
rather requires the exercise of judgment on the part of the person making it . . . .”).
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Administrator seeks to exercise.” The committee indicated that the
reason for varied implementation was Congress’s intent that the
determination of “unreasonable risk” involve a “balancing” of the
probability of harm from a chemical with the harm to society from
216
limiting the use of a chemical.
As is explicitly noted in the
legislative history, the implementation of section 4 of TSCA will not
result in the public being deprived of the benefits of a chemical that
is subject to a test rule, and therefore the determination of
217
unreasonable risk should reflect that fact.
Though the legislative history does not specifically discuss the
considerations Congress intended EPA to evaluate when determining
218
“unreasonable risk” in the section 5(b)(4)(A) context,
the
considerations are analogous to those in the section 4(a)(1)(A)
context. Just as subjecting a chemical to a section 4 test rule will not
deprive the public of the benefits of that chemical, adding a chemical
to a section 5(b)(4)(A) Chemicals of Concern list will also not
deprive the public of the benefits of that chemical. Thus, because
the effect of the regulation under section 4(a)(1)(A) and section
5(b)(4)(A) is similar, it follows that the implementation of the term
“unreasonable risk” should be similar in both contexts. In sum, here,
where Congress’s intent with respect to the use of “unreasonable risk”
in these two sections appears to be the same, the presumption that
219
these two terms have the same meaning should not yield.
Accordingly, courts should find that the interpretation of
“unreasonable risk” in the section 5(b)(4)(A) context is analogous to
the section 4(a)(1)(A) context.
Further, a court may find that the term “unreasonable risk” could
be applied even more expansively in the section 5(b)(4)(A) context.
The probability of harm to the environment addressed by a section
5(b)(4)(A) rule would be balanced against an even lower level of
harm to manufacturers from the result of the rule than in the section
4(a)(1)(A) context; when EPA issues a rule pursuant to section
5(b)(4)(A), it does so at no direct expense to a chemical
220
manufacturer. Thus, this type of rule can serve as a mechanism for
215. Id. at 422.
216. Id. at 421–22.
217. Id. at 422 (“[A] determination that a risk associated with a chemical
substance or mixture is unreasonable involves balancing the probability that harm
will occur . . . against the effect of proposed regulatory action on the availability [of a
chemical] to society . . . .”).
218. Id. at 421–22.
219. Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007).
220. Unlike a section 4(a)(1)(A) test rule, which requires that manufacturers
submit extensive testing data, the creation of a section 5(b)(4)(A) Chemicals of
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EPA to draw attention to chemical risks and provide an indirect
environmental benefit via potentially changed consumer habits,
weighed against a relatively low cost to manufacturers. In contrast,
testing pursuant to section 4(a)(1)(A) also provides an indirect
environmental benefit, but this benefit is weighed against a multi221
million dollar burden to manufacturers.
However, whether
“unreasonable risk” is interpreted more leniently in the section
5(b)(4)(A) context or not, it follows that a court will likely be at least
as deferential to EPA in construing section 5(b)(4)(A) as in
construing section 4(a)(1)(A).
In interpreting “unreasonable risk” in cases involving challenges to
section 4(a)(1)(A) rules, courts have shown EPA significant
deference both in making its determination as to what constitutes
“unreasonable risk” and the type of evidence required to support that
determination. For example, in Chemical Manufacturers, the D.C.
Circuit held that to show that a chemical poses an “unreasonable
risk,” EPA must simply show that the risk caused by the chemical is
“more probable than not,” and further, that EPA can issue a rule so
long as it has a “more-than-theoretical basis” for believing that a
222
chemical is toxic at a given exposure level. Thus, the standard for
showing “unreasonable risk” affords EPA significant latitude in
determining the basis for the risk.
Despite this latitude, in section 4(a)(1)(A) as well as in section
5(b)(4)(A), EPA must still support its determination with substantial
223
evidence. However, Ausimont shows that in the section 4(a)(1)(A)
context, and by analogy in the section 5(b)(4)(A) context, substantial
evidence review requires that EPA “demonstrate not fact, but doubt
224
and uncertainty.”
Thus, EPA is not required to gather evidence
that conclusively shows that a chemical poses a high level of risk, but
rather it must show that there is potential that a chemical poses such a
225
risk (i.e. “doubt and uncertainty”).
To date, EPA has based its choice of chemicals to be added to a
Chemicals of Concern list on existing toxicity data and “evidence of
226
pervasive human and environmental exposure.”
For each of the
Concern list does not create a direct expense for chemical manufacturers.
221. Id.
222. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 859 F.2d 977, 984–85 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
223. TSCA § 19(c)(1)(B)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 2618(c)(1)(B)(i) (2006) (requiring
courts to “hold unlawful and set aside” any rule that is “not supported by substantial
evidence in the rulemaking record”).
224. Ausimont U.S.A. Inc. v. EPA, 838 F.2d 93, 96 (3d Cir. 1988).
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PHTHALATES ACTION PLAN 1 (2009),
available at http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/existingchemicals/pubs/actionplans/
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chemicals that EPA has proposed adding to the list, EPA already has
extensive evidence that each chemical poses “an unreasonable risk”
227
to human health and the environment.
In Ausimont, the Third
Circuit held that so long as EPA has supported its finding of the
potential for risk, it has met its burden under the substantial evidence
228
standard.
Here, EPA has documentation of the known, as well as
potential, risks of listed chemicals from existing studies and testing to
229
Therefore, a court will likely find EPA’s
support its finding.
authority to list such substances under section 5(b)(4)(A) has been
triggered.
Lastly, while listing a chemical on a Chemicals of Concern list
pursuant to section 5(b)(4)(A) does not create a direct expense for
manufacturers, manufacturers might argue that it costs them in terms
230
of advertising and public relations value. However, a court is likely
to uphold EPA’s section 5(b)(4)(A) rule adding chemicals to a
Chemicals of Concern list regardless of the economic impact of the
listing, so long as the statutory requirements of section 5(b)(4)(A)
are met. Unlike section 6 of TSCA, which explicitly requires that EPA
consider the balancing of environmental and health concerns versus
231
economic impact, section 5(b)(4)(A) explicitly requires EPA to
consider only two factors: 1) the effects of a chemical substance on
232
health and 2) the effects of such substance on the environment. In
section 5(b)(4)(A), Congress does not explicitly require EPA to
consider effects other than those on health and the environment as it
does in section 6, and therefore a court is unlikely to fault EPA for
233
basing its listing determination on non-economic factors.
phthalates_ap_2009_1230_final.pdf (describing a plan to regulate chemicals that are
“produced in high volume, over 470 million pounds per year”).
227. See id. (noting that according to Center for Disease Control studies, “[a]
number of phthalates appear in biomonitoring surveys of human tissues, evidencing
widespread human exposure”).
228. Ausimont, 838 F.2d at 96.
229. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 226, at 1 (stating various health risks
associated with exposure to phthalates).
230. See Charles M. Auer et al., TSCA Section 5(b)(4) ‘Chemicals of Concern’ List:
Questions, Issues, Concerns, B.N.A. DAILY ENV’T REP., May 24, 2010, at B-4 (observing
that similar lists created pursuant to other laws have had far-reaching effects,
including publication of the lists by environmental groups and states using the list as
a basis to ban a chemical).
231. See TSCA § 6(c)(1)(C)–(D), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1)(C)–(D) (2006)
(requiring that EPA consider “the benefits of such substance or mixture for various
uses and the availability of substitutes for such uses, and . . . the reasonably
ascertainable economic consequences of the rule, after consideration of the effect on
the national economy, small business, technological innovation, the environment,
and public health”).
232. Id. § 5(b)(4)(A)(ii).
233. Compare id. § 5(b)(4)(A)(ii) (failing to include economic factors as a
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In sum, the creation of a Chemicals of Concern list is within EPA’s
authority, and courts should uphold EPA’s action in creating such a
list if challenged. The creation of this list presents an opportunity for
the Agency to draw further attention to the threats of certain
chemicals. This list can serve as a tool to raise public awareness about
the risks of harm from certain chemicals, as adding chemicals to the
list is likely to gain media attention. EPA’s announcement that it was
targeting certain chemicals for potential addition prompted
widespread media coverage, including discussion of the threats of
234
BPA, PBDE, and phthalates.
Media coverage of EPA’s decision to
list BPA as a potential “chemical of concern” included information
about the threat of BPA (including heart disease and cancer), its
prevalence (“90 percent of Americans show traces of it in their
urine”), and how it can be avoided (by refusing to use hard plastic
235
food and drink containers that are not labeled BPA-free).
Thus,
EPA’s use of its section 5(b)(4)(A) authority has the potential to
serve as an important catalyst for consumer awareness about the
harm posed by various chemicals.
C. Corrosion Proof Fittings Revisited: Why a Judicial Activist Decision
Should Not Prevent EPA from Using Its Section 6 Authority Today
In its Chemical Action Plans, EPA has announced its intention to
use its section 6 authority with renewed and unprecedented vigor,
proposing to regulate phthalates, which pose potentially serious
threats to male reproductive systems and to child development; longchain perfluorinated chemicals (PFCs), which have been shown to be
toxic to wildlife; and short-chain chlorinated paraffins (SCCPs),
236
among others.
EPA’s Chemical Action Plans have generated rapt
attention in the TSCA community because EPA has not used its
section 6 authority to ban a chemical since the Fifth Circuit’s
237
rejection of EPA’s asbestos ban in Corrosion Proof Fittings. This case
consideration), with id. § 6(c)(1)(D) (explicitly requiring EPA to consider economic
factors in addition to effects on health and the environment).
234. See, e.g., David A. Fahrenthold, EPA Calls BPA a ‘Chemical of Concern’, WASH.
POST, Mar. 30, 2010, at A9; Elana Schor, Enviro Groups Press for Expanded EPA Oversight
of Household Toxins, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/
gwire/2010/10/19/19greenwire-enviro-groups-press-for-expanded-epa-oversight17542.html (noting the existence of “a growing body of scientific literature
indicating that phthalates interfere with endocrine and reproductive functioning,”
and that EPA has begun the process of regulating these chemicals).
235. Schor, supra note 234.
236. See Auer et al., supra note 148, at 10,243 (noting that “EPA has never
previously announced so many actions under [TSCA], nor has it ever cited use of § 6
so widely”).
237. See EPA Issues Four Chemical Action Plans Under TSCA, BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND,
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has been called a “death knell” for EPA’s attempts to use section 6 to
238
ban chemicals under TSCA. However, the Fifth Circuit’s use of the
“substantial evidence” standard of review in Corrosion Proof Fittings was
erroneously invasive. Subsequent reviews of EPA’s use of its section 6
authority should be more deferential to the Agency to increase the
chance that such rules will be upheld.
In its review of EPA’s proposed asbestos ban, the Fifth Circuit
inserted requirements into section 6 of TSCA which neither the
239
language of the statute, nor its legislative history, support. Section
19 of TSCA provides that a reviewing court shall hold unlawful and
set aside a section 6 rule if the court determines that, upon review of
240
the record, the rule is not supported by substantial evidence.
In
Corrosion Proof Fittings, the Fifth Circuit correctly summarized the
241
Supreme Court’s statement in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB that
substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
242
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
The
court also correctly pointed out that substantial evidence review
enables courts to exert greater scrutiny of agency decision-making
than arbitrary and capricious review, and requires “careful scrutiny”
243
of agency findings.
Despite its accurate summary of the
requirements of substantial evidence review, the Fifth Circuit erred in
its application of this standard to the facts of the case before it.
In evaluating whether EPA had met the requirements of section 6,
so as to trigger its authority to ban a chemical, the Fifth Circuit went
beyond a searching review for “substantial evidence” and instead read
requirements into the statute that were neither included nor
P.C.
(Jan.
5,
2010),
http://www.bdlaw.com/assets/attachments/2010-0105%20BD%20Client%20Alert%20-%20EPA%20Issues%20Four%20Chemical%
20Action%20Plans%20Under%20TSCA.pdf (observing that “[t]his is the first time
EPA has proposed significant actions under TSCA § 6(a) . . . since the asbestos ban
was invalidated in 1991”).
238. Noah Sachs, Blocked Pathways: Potential Legal Responses to Endocrine Disrupting
Chemicals, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 289, 324 (1999) (quoting DAN FAGIN & MARIANNE
LAVELLE, TOXIC DECEPTION: HOW THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY MANIPULATES SCIENCE,
BENDS THE LAW, AND ENDANGERS YOUR HEALTH 138 (1996)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
239. Compare TSCA § 6(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c) (2006) (requiring only that EPA
issue reports on the effects of substances on the environment and people, and the
economic consequences of the rule), with Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d
1201, 1217 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he EPA must show not only that its proposed action
reduces the risk of the product to an adequate level, but also that the actions
Congress identified as less burdensome also would not do the job.”).
240. TSCA § 19(c)(1)(B)(i).
241. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
242. Id. at 477 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
243. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1213–14.

TREVISAN.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

3/26/2012 8:12 PM

HUMAN HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT CAN’T WAIT

421

intended by Congress. Specifically, the court interpreted section 6 as
requiring that EPA must make a showing, after it has chosen what it
considers to be the least burdensome regulatory option to address a
chemical’s risk, that each of the other six alternatives in the statute
244
are not also sufficient to reduce that risk. Section 6 of TSCA directs
EPA to regulate a chemical “to the extent necessary to protect
adequately against [health and environmental] risk using the least
245
burdensome requirements.”
The statute does not mandate that
EPA apply any particular methodology or formula in determining
whether the regulation it has chosen is the “least burdensome”
246
option.
This requirement imposed by the court, though not
required by the statute, could be seen as the equivalent of what courts
should look for when evaluating a section 6 rule under substantial
247
evidence review.
However, the court then went a step further,
outside the bounds of substantial evidence review, to require that
248
EPA make this showing using cost-benefit analysis.
In imposing the requirement that EPA make a quantitative
showing as to why each possible alternative to its intended regulation
will not also protect against risk, the Fifth Circuit went beyond the
already stringent mandate that Congress gave to EPA in TSCA by
249
creating its own artificial requirement.
While the Supreme Court
has noted that substantial evidence review is more invasive than
250
traditional arbitrary and capricious review, it does not follow that
this form of review enables courts to impose judicially-created
requirements on agencies, outside of what is already required of
244. Id. at 1217.
245. TSCA § 6(a).
246. Id.; see, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking:
A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 546 (1997) (arguing that in
Corrosion Proof Fittings, the court “clearly failed to give any deference to EPA’s
interpretation of its statute and it arguably misinterpreted the statute when it alluded
to ‘TSCA’s requirement that [EPA’s] alternative be the least burdensome of all those
offered to it’” (quoting Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1216)).
247. By requiring EPA to document why it did not choose each of the other
regulatory alternatives in the statute, the court ensured that EPA is essentially
populating the record with documentation that its chosen regulation is supported by
substantial evidence. See TSCA § 19.
248. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1222.
249. There is no requirement in section 6 of the TSCA that EPA must individually
evaluate each of the seven regulatory options listed in that section. See TSCA § 6(a).
Rather, the findings that the statute does require EPA to produce are explicitly listed
in section 6(c). Id. § 6(c) (listing the following requirements: (1) the effects of
substances on people; (2) the effects of substances on the environment; (3) the
benefits of substances and the substances’ substitutes; and (4) the reasonably
ascertainable economic consequences of the rule).
250. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 143 (1967) (noting that the
substantial evidence test affords a “considerably more generous judicial review than
the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ test”).
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them by the statutes they are charged with implementing. Rather,
this standard explicitly requires a court to review the record for
substantial evidence to support EPA’s determination that a ban is
“the least burdensome requirement[]” that is “necessary to protect
251
Nowhere in the statute does
adequately” against chemical risk.
Congress require that EPA accompany this finding with extensive
evaluations of the quantitative costs and benefits of each possible
252
alternative.
Here, the Fifth Circuit found that “[m]uch of EPA’s analysis”
253
necessitating the ban was correct, and acknowledged that “EPA
254
mentions the problems posed by intermediate levels of regulation.”
This finding alone—that EPA’s analysis supporting the ban was
“correct” and that EPA reasoned through why lower levels of
regulation would not suffice—appears to meet the Supreme Court’s
requirement in Universal Camera that “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion”
255
be present. Yet, rather than applying the Supreme Court’s test, the
Fifth Circuit faulted EPA for failing “to calculate the costs and
256
benefits of these intermediate levels [of regulation].” While EPA is
statutorily required to choose the “least burdensome requirement[],”
it is not required to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of each regulatory
257
option presented to it.
The court itself noted earlier in its opinion that “[a]n agency may
exercise its judgment without strictly relying upon quantifiable risks,
costs, and benefits” so long as the agency explains why it made the
decision it did, and shows a rational connection between the facts at
258
issue and its choice of regulation. By evaluating the problems with
lesser levels of regulation, EPA met this requirement. Further, the
Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen Congress has intended that an
agency engage in cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such
259
intent on the face of the statute.” Here, rather than expressing its
intent that EPA conduct a cost-benefit analysis before issuing a

251. TSCA § 6(a).
252. Id. § 6(c).
253. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1216.
254. Id. at 1217.
255. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (quoting Consol.
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
256. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1217.
257. See TSCA § 6(a) (requiring that EPA use the “least burdensome
requirement[]” to address chemical risk, but at no point specifying the manner in
which EPA must make this choice).
258. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1214.
259. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510 (1981).
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section 6 rule, Congress stated that the balancing process inherent in
making “a determination that a risk associated with a chemical
substance . . . is unreasonable involves balancing . . . [but] does not
require a formal benefit-cost analysis under which a monetary value is
260
assigned to the risks associated.”
Contrary to the court’s conclusion that EPA must consider and
reject each less burdensome form of regulation based on quantitative
261
data, the legislative history of section 6 indicates that Congress did
not intend for EPA to undertake this level of exhaustive quantitative
analysis. The TSCA House Report specifically stated that Congress
did not intend for necessary regulation to “be unreasonably delayed
while the Administrator develops quantative [sic] data comparing the
262
costs of control methods.” Rather, members of Congress expected
that “the determination of the least burdensome requirement
w[ould] be based on information submitted to the Administration
during the rulemaking proceeding and other information which is
263
readily available.” Congress intended for EPA to base its analysis on
the resources the agency had on hand, and not on drawn out cost
264
projections that fail to quantify qualitative benefits of the rule.
Thus, in Corrosion Proof Fittings, the Fifth Circuit’s review of EPA’s
asbestos ban exceeded what is required by both the statute itself and
Congress’s expressed intentions in the statute’s legislative history.
If EPA determines that any of the chemicals currently poised for
section 6 action in its Chemical Action Plans “present[] or will
present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment,”
it should proceed with whichever regulatory option it finds is
“necessary to protect adequately against such risk” and is the “least
265
burdensome.” A reviewing court should not hold EPA to the Fifth
Circuit’s non-statutorily based requirement—that EPA bears the
burden of performing a full cost-benefit analysis for each alternative
listed in section 6 before its chosen regulation can be upheld.
Though TSCA does require that EPA choose the “least burdensome

260. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1341, at 14 (1976), reprinted in H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES
CONTROL ACT, at 408 (Comm. Print 1976) (noting that “a risk associated with a
chemical substance or mixture is unreasonable [if] the probability that harm will
occur and the magnitude or severity of that harm [outweighs] the effect of proposed
regulatory action on the availability to society of the benefits of the substance or
mixture”).
261. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1217, 1228.
262. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1341, at 34.
263. Id. (emphases added).
264. Id.
265. TSCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006).
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requirement[],” it does not require EPA to substantiate that choice
by quantitatively and extensively analyzing the costs and benefits of
266
each option.
EPA is required to support its choice of the “least
burdensome” regulatory option by “substantial evidence,” which the
Supreme Court defined as evidence that “a reasonable mind might
267
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
For the foregoing reasons, the thorough consideration, rationale,
and analysis accompanying EPA’s rejection of lesser measures in
Corrosion Proof Fittings should be enough to adequately support any
future regulations imposed by EPA under section 6. As noted by the
Congress that passed TSCA, it was not Congress’s intent that “needed
regulation be unreasonably delayed while the Administrator develops
268
quantative [sic] data comparing the costs of control methods.”
Rather, the likely regulatory actions posed by the current EPA should
be upheld so long as they are issued in conformity with the statute’s
requirements, which do not include extensive, highly detailed, and
purely quantitative cost-benefit analysis to make a showing that the
“least burdensome” alternative has been selected.
III. TSCA’S PREEMPTION PROVISION ALLOWS STATES TO TAKE BROAD
ACTION TO REGULATE CHEMICALS
TSCA’s preemption provision, found in section 18, allows states to
freely regulate chemicals so long as EPA has not yet acted to regulate
269
them.
However, even if EPA has taken regulatory action under
section 5 or section 6 of TSCA, state laws regulating the same
chemicals are not preempted so long as they match whatever
requirement has been promulgated by EPA, or are more stringent
270
(meaning they ban the chemical substance entirely).
TSCA’s
expansive preemption provision is the first place that a reviewing
271
court will look in determining whether a state law is preempted.
Because this provision expressly allows that, unless EPA has already
taken action, “nothing . . . shall affect the authority of any State or
266. Id.
267. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (quoting Consol.
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
268. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1341, at 34 (1976), reprinted in H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES
CONTROL ACT, at 427 (Comm. Print 1976).
269. TSCA § 18(a).
270. Id. § 18(a)(2)(B).
271. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) (observing that
if a statute contains an express preemption clause, a court should first “focus on the
plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of
Congress’s pre-emptive intent”).
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political subdivision of a State to establish or continue in effect
272
regulation of any chemical substance,” states have broad leeway in
regulating chemicals that they determine pose a risk to their
populations or environment. Under this provision, the fact that EPA
273
has regulated only five chemicals to date lends itself to even
274
broader state action.
States have used their essentially unlimited (due to lack of
regulation at the federal level) authority to regulate chemicals with
275
much greater frequency than has occurred under TSCA, and courts
should allow states to continue to do so under TSCA’s current
preemption provision. Further, the regulations that states have
issued have in many instances succeeded at regulating chemical risks
276
where TSCA has failed. For example, one of the earliest state toxic
laws, California’s Proposition 65 (passed as a ballot initiative in 1986),
requires that the Governor of California once a year “cause to be
published a list of those chemicals known to the state to cause cancer
277
or reproductive toxicity.”
It also requires businesses to provide
consumers, or others exposed to their products, with a “clear and
278
reasonable warning” if their products contain a listed chemical.
Thus, without violating TSCA’s preemption provision, California has
required warning labels for over 800 chemicals known to cause
279
cancer and reproductive toxicity.
Other states have followed in California’s footsteps and regulated
chemical manufacturers or producers outside the void of action
under TSCA, and these actions are similarly permitted under TSCA’s

272. TSCA § 18(a).
273. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 75, at 58–60 (noting that to
date EPA has regulated five chemicals under section 6).
274. While there have been no preemption challenges to EPA action under the
TSCA’s main title (for the reasons discussed in this Part), there have been a number
of challenges to state laws regulating polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). See, e.g., City
of Chesapeake v. Sutton Enters., Inc. 138 F.R.D. 468, 477–78 (E.D. Va. 1990).
Because PCBs were a known risk at the time of the TSCA’s passage, Congress created
an explicit federal scheme to manage the use and disposal of PCBs. TSCA § 6(e); 40
C.F.R. pt. 761 (2010). State laws imposing lesser PCB requirements are preempted
by the extensive federal regulation. See, e.g, City of Chesapeake, 138 F.R.D. at 477.
275. See BELLIVEAU, supra note 13, at 6 (observing that “18 states have passed 71
chemical safety laws in the last eight years”).
276. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.8 (West 2006) (requiring
labeling of products containing chemicals identified as carcinogenic or toxic); ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 38, § 1691 to 1699-B (2010) (granting the state authority to ban
chemicals that are identified as hazardous to children).
277. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.8(a).
278. Id. § 25249.6.
279. Proposition 65 in Plain Language!, CAL. OFFICE OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD
ASSESSMENT, http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/background/p65plain.html (last updated
Mar. 2010).
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preemption provision. In 2007, Maine adopted the Toxic Chemicals
280
in Children’s Products Law, which—like California’s Proposition
65—requires the state environmental department to “publish a list of
281
chemicals of high concern.”
The basis for this list is whether
chemicals are: “[A] [a] carcinogen, a reproductive or developmental
toxicant or an endocrine disruptor; [B] [p]ersistent, bioaccumulative
282
and toxic; or [C] [v]ery persistent and very bioaccumulative.”
Section 5(b)(4)(A) of TSCA similarly enables EPA to publish a list
of hazardous chemicals; however, EPA may only list chemicals that
283
pose an “unreasonable risk.” Under the Maine Toxic Chemicals in
Children’s Products Law, there is no qualifier for the risk of a
chemical: so long as the chemical has any of the specified effects, it
284
can be added to the list. It is of no consequence that the risk may
be minute; as long as it is present, the state can make it known to the
285
286
public. Even once EPA issues its final Chemicals of Concern list,
lists like Maine’s, California’s, and any other states’, will not be
287
preempted. Section 18 requires that if EPA has issued a rule under
section 5 addressing a certain chemical, a state rule also addressing
that chemical will be upheld so long as it is consistent with and as
288
stringent as EPA’s rule. Because both the Maine statute and section
5(b)(4)(a) similarly result in the creation of a list, any chemical that
is listed by both the state and EPA will therefore be subject to
289
identical treatment.
Therefore, any state law that requires the
listing of a chemical also listed by EPA will likely be upheld.
After the list is set, the Maine Toxic Chemicals in Children’s
Products Law then places an affirmative duty on manufacturers to
notify the department regarding their production and use of the
280. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, § 1691 to 1699-B.
281. Id. § 1693(1).
282. Id.
283. TSCA § 5(b)(4)(A)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(b)(4)(A)(i) (2006); see also supra
Part II.B (discussing the scope of EPA’s ability to create a list of hazardous
chemicals).
284. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, § 1693(1).
285. See id. (providing that the state “shall publish a list of chemicals of high
concern,” which means any chemical that on the “basis of credible scientific
evidence” has been determined to cause cancer or disrupt endocrine or hormonal
systems, is “[p]ersistent, bioaccumulative and toxic,” or is “[v]ery persistent and very
bioaccumulative”).
286. See supra Part II.B (discussing EPA’s plan to issue a “Chemicals of Concern”
list).
287. See TSCA § 18(a) (establishing that no state law shall be preempted unless
EPA has enacted a similar requirement, in which case the state requirement must be
“identical,” adopted under the Clean Air Act, or be a blanket prohibition of the
chemical).
288. Id.
289. See id.
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290

listed chemical. Unlike TSCA, this law does not require notification
only of the production of new chemicals and existing chemicals put
to a “significant new use,” but of all chemicals contained on the
291
priority list.
The fact that TSCA distinguishes between new and
existing chemicals, allowing greater leeway for the untested
production of chemicals that existed when TSCA passed, has been a
292
frequent point of criticism. State laws have responded—as Maine’s
Toxic Chemicals in Children’s Products Law demonstrates—by
regulating all chemicals alike and not allowing one group to escape
293
regulation.
The Toxic Chemicals in Children’s Products Law also provides that
the state can decide to “prohibit[] the manufacture, sale or
distribution in the State” of a listed chemical if it finds that children
or other vulnerable populations are exposed to the chemical and that
294
a safer alternative is available.
Unlike in TSCA where there is a
295
requirement to choose the “least burdensome requirement[],” here
the state is directed to identify the safest alternatives to chemical
296
risks. The statute directs manufacturers of children’s products that
contain hazardous chemicals to comply by either: (1) substituting a
safer alternative in the product or (2) discontinuing sales of the
297
product altogether.
This provision, which allows the state to ban
the use of a chemical where a safer alternative is unavailable, is well
within TSCA’s preemption clause, which states that even where EPA
has promulgated a section 5 or section 6 rule regulating a substance,
298
a state ban of that substance is not preempted.
TSCA’s preemption provision grants states generous authority to
regulate chemical risks within their borders. If EPA follows through
299
with its proposed section 6 actions, which include potential bans,
290. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, § 1695(1).
291. TSCA § 5(a)(1)(B).
292. See Greenwood, supra note 205, at 10,040 (describing the “fundamental
problem[s] inherent in a regulatory program built around a distinction between
things new and existing”).
293. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, § 1691 to 1699-B.
294. Id. § 1696(1).
295. TSCA § 6(a).
296. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, § 1696(1)(B).
297. Id. § 1696.
298. TSCA § 18(a)(2)(B) (stating that where “the Administrator prescribes a rule
or order under section [5] or [6] . . . “no State . . . may . . . establish or continue in
effect any requirement which is applicable to such substance or mixture . . . unless
such requirement . . . (iii) prohibits the use or such substance or mixture in such
State”).
299. See Existing Chemicals Action Plans, supra note 153 (stating that EPA is
considering banning a number of chemicals under its section 6 authority, including
phthalates).
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those bans would preempt any state laws regarding the banned
chemicals only if the state laws were less stringent. However, as many
300
state laws include bans and other strong regulations, it is likely that
even with aggressive federal action, state laws would still be upheld
under TSCA’s preemption provision.
CONCLUSION
Chemicals are an ever-present and fully integrated part of the
fabric of American life. Some of the risks of commonly used
chemicals were known at the time of TSCA’s passage, and more are
known now. However, many of these risks have come to light not
through statutorily required testing performed by chemical
manufacturers, but rather through independent studies that find
dangers to humans and the environment after the harmful effects of
301
chemicals are already occurring.
Historically, under the current
version of TSCA, once these risks became known, attempts at
302
regulating them proved too difficult to undertake.
However, this Comment argues that the current Toxic Substances
Control Act gives EPA the legal authority to: require additional
testing of the most prevalent chemicals using section 4; draw
attention to chemical risks using section 5; and regulate hazardous
chemicals using section 6. These steps, and others that EPA is
303
currently undertaking, are essential to protect public health and
the environment from chemical risks in the near term. In each of the
sections of TSCA addressed in this Comment, EPA has substantial
discretion to exercise its authority, and courts are likely to recognize

300. See BELLIVEAU, supra note 13, at 12–13 (listing eighteen states that have
banned or phased out hazardous chemicals).
301. For example, BPA existed at the time of TSCA’s passage; however, no test
rule was ever issued to determine the risks that it posed. Instead, these risks came to
light through a series of independent and government studies. See Kolbert, supra
note 117 (summarizing the work of a prominent BPA researcher, including a
sequence of studies drawing attention to the risks of BPA); see also Houlihan et al.,
supra note 119 (chronicling the history of BPA).
302. See supra Part I.B (discussing the hurdles to using the regulatory authority
granted to EPA by TSCA).
303. On February 10, 2011, EPA notified five chemical manufacturers that
information about their products which they claimed constituted “Confidential
Business Information” (CBI), and was thus exempt from public disclosure, was not in
fact CBI. Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Removes Confidentiality
Claims on Studies of Chemicals Submitted Under TSCA (Feb. 10, 2011),
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/d0cf6618525a9efb85257359003fb69d/f
b73e2f72dc2fc98852578330053cf62!OpenDocument.
EPA announced that this
“critical health and safety information” would now be released to the public. Id.
While this action is outside the scope of this Comment, it is indicative of EPA’s
continued work to assert its TSCA authority.
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304

and uphold EPA’s use of this discretion. Despite TSCA’s flaws, EPA
does have the legal authority to prevent the general public and the
environment from continuing to be a “laboratory for discovering
305
adverse health effects” of hazardous chemicals.
Further, this Comment also argues that TSCA’s section 18 express
preemption provision allows for expansive state action to build on
what the federal government is able to do using the latter sources of
306
authority. States such as California, Maine, and many others have
passed legislation that does what the federal government has not:
307
ban the use of dangerous chemicals, as well as enable state
environmental agencies to choose the safest alternative—as opposed
308
309
to the “least burdensome” —when regulating a chemical.
This
combination of federal tools and state action can serve as an
important step toward the preventative and responsive approach to
chemical regulation that the 1971 CEQ Toxic Substances report
310
envisioned.
However, while this Comment argues that chemical regulation can
and should occur now—before reform bills are passed in several (or
perhaps many) years—it also acknowledges that reform is the best
option for achieving TSCA’s goals of a preventative and readily
responsive system of chemical regulation. Though EPA does have
legal authority to issue section 4 test rules to obtain information
about highly prevalent chemicals and to issue section 6 regulations,
including bans, EPA still must face the built-in procedural hurdles
contained in these sections of the statute; namely, the extensive
311
In a 2005
rulemaking requirements that EPA must comply with.
report to Congress, the Government Accountability Office noted
that, according to EPA officials, “finalizing rules under section 4 of
TSCA can take from 2 to 10 years and require the expenditure of
312
substantial resources.”
In 1994, EPA officials estimated that test
313
rules could cost the Agency as much as $250,000 to issue.
Similar
costs and hurdles face EPA in issuing a section 6 rule, even without
304. Supra Part II.
305. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 4, at 21.
306. Supra Part III; see also BELLIVEAU, supra note 13 (analyzing state efforts to
regulate chemicals in the absence of federal regulation).
307. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, § 1696 (2010).
308. TSCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006).
309. Id.
310. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 4, at 21 (commenting that through
TSCA, the government would “no longer be limited to repairing damage after it
ha[d] been done”).
311. Supra Part I.B.1.
312. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 75, at 26.
313. Id.
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the cost-benefit analysis erroneously required by the Fifth Circuit.
These procedural obstacles, and the burden placed on EPA to go
after chemical manufacturers for data, as opposed to the
314
make the current legal
manufacturers sending data to EPA,
authority difficult to use.
315
While these procedural obstacles are legally surmountable, doing
316
so requires expenditures of significant resources and time. Despite
EPA’s legal authority to take action to address chemical risks,
alleviating the burdens inherent in the current law would make EPA’s
task more efficient, and likely more effective. Both the House and
317
Senate reform bills work to remove these obstacles, and thus create
a more fluid and readily adaptable regulatory scheme than currently
exists. States have voiced their support for reform, and they are
awaiting a uniform federal standard that will not necessitate the
318
extensive patchwork of state laws currently in place. While EPA and
the states can and should use their authority under TSCA to take
steps toward chemical regulation, reform is necessary to transition
from a relatively less-efficient approach under the current law to a
streamlined and efficient system of chemical management via the
proposed reforms.

314. See supra Part I.C.2 (giving an overview of the major differences between
TSCA and the House and Senate reform bills, including the requirement in the
reform bills that manufacturers have an affirmative duty to send health and safety
data to EPA, and further that EPA can require additional data via an order, which is
much less cumbersome than a rule).
315. See supra Part II (arguing that EPA does have legal authority to take steps to
require additional testing, draw attention to chemical risks, and issue bans or other
chemical regulation).
316. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 75, at 26.
317. Supra Part I.C.2.
318. Resolution Urging Congress to Reform the Toxic Substances Control Act, ENVTL.
COUNCIL OF THE STATES (Aug. 30 2010), http://www.ecos.org/section/committees/
cross_media.

